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This Article offers a theory of international civil disobedience
under which a state could stage an unlawful military intervention
to stop massive human rights abuses without sacrificing its respect
for the rule of international law—if the intervention conformed to
the characteristics that distinguish international civil disobedience
from other types of illegal conduct.
These are publicity,
conscientiousness, a preference for non-violence, and willingness to
accept the legal consequences of the disobedient act. These
requirements collectively set an appropriately high bar for the use of
force outside the constraints of the Charter of the United Nations. A
state meeting that bar, however, would have a claim to moral
standing unavailable to other violators of the prohibition of the use
of force.
The demands of public morality and the demands of international
law conflict in cases where the former compels military intervention
to end mass atrocities and the latter forbids that intervention. On
most accounts, concerned states would therefore be forced to choose
between two unattractive options. Violating the prohibition of the
use of force would weaken a foundational norm of the modern
international system and undermine the claim of international law
to be able to constrain the behavior of states. Refraining from
intervening despite strong moral reasons to do so would de-legitimize
international law, showing it to be a system unable to implement the
fundamental principles on which it claims to be based. This Article
offers a potential solution to that dilemma.
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I. INTRODUCTION
[A]n individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is
unjust, and who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in
order to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is
in reality expressing the highest respect for law.
Martin Luther King, Jr.1
This Article argues that states motivated to use military force to
stop massive human rights violations but loath to violate international
law do not need to choose between saving lives and upholding the
rule of law. Rather, states can do both by engaging in a kind of
principled disregard of the law. This Article will refer to that
principled disregard as “international civil disobedience” but will
acknowledge that the dissimilarities between the domestic and
international context are such that the term “civil disobedience” may
work more as an analogy than by direct application.
Consider three contrasting scenarios. In the first, a government
rains horror down on the civilians entrusted to its care. Hundreds of
thousands are killed. Shopkeepers are choked on poison gas,
schoolteachers tortured to death, and farmers bombed to dust by the
very authorities charged with protecting their human rights. Millions
run from their homes. In response, the United States seeks
authorization for military intervention from the United Nations
Security Council but the Security Council rejects the request.
Nonetheless, the United States—perhaps with some allies, perhaps
not—attacks the offending regime intending to end, or at least
significantly curb, the violence. But in so doing it contravenes, and
thereby undermines, one of the bedrock norms of international law—
the prohibition on the use of force. This hypothetical scenario is, of
course, not dissimilar from what almost happened in Syria in late
20132 (and what, arguably, is happening at the end of 2014),3 when
1. Letter from Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963).
2. Anne Gearan, Diplomacy Is Failing in Syria, Obama Acknowledges, WASH. POST (Feb.
11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/diplomacy-is-failingin-syria-obama-acknowledges/2014/02/11/822065e6-935c-11e3-84e127626c5ef5fb_story.html.
3. At the time of this writing, the United States is conducting an air campaign against
a rebel group—variously referred to as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) and the
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant—in Syria. See, e.g., U.S., Allies Launch Barrage of
Airstrikes
Against
Islamic
State,
REUTERS
(Nov.
10,
2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/10/us-mideast-crisis-usa-airstrikesidUSKCN0IU1KU20141110. While the legality of particular military operations is beyond
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the Obama administration called for military intervention in the
Syrian civil war, notwithstanding the impossibility of authorization
from the Security Council.4
Although calling for an attack that would violate the prohibition
on the use of force under the Charter of the United Nations (“U.N.
Charter”),5 the Obama administration never offered a legal
justification. Nor did it clarify how its calls for Syrian accountability to
international legal standards squared with its own apparent intention
to violate one of the most important of those standards. For those
concerned with the legitimacy and integrity of international law, with
the reputation of the United States and its ability to conduct foreign
policy, or with the consequences of weakening the legal prohibition
on the use of force, leaving the issue unresolved in that way was, and
is, deeply troubling.
In the second, very real, scenario, genocide was brewing in
Rwanda. Agents on the ground informed the United States, the
United Nations, and other powerful members of the international
community of the impending catastrophe.6 Yet they did nothing.
Genocidaires butchered nearly a million people in the space of 100
days.7 Remorseful participants and meticulous researchers later
exposed the political calculus behind the Clinton administration’s
refusal to intervene, to the enduring shame of the United States.8
the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that the argument presented herein focuses on
military intervention in internal conflict. When more than one state is involved, as with
ISIS, which operates in both Syria and Iraq, the analysis changes. It is possible to argue,
for instance, that Iraq’s invitation to the United States to participate in its self-defense
against ISIS includes a limited right to pursue ISIS forces within Syria. See, e.g., Ryan
Goodman, International Law on Airstrikes Against ISIS in Syria, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 28,
2014), http://justsecurity.org/14414/international-law-airstrikes-isis-syria/.
4. Mark Landler, David E. Sanger & Thom Shanker, Obama Set for Limited Strike on
Syria
as
British
Vote
No,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
29,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/30/us/politics/obamasyria.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
5. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
6. General Roméo Dallaire, the Canadian military commander of the United Nations
peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, repeatedly warned of impending disaster. In one of his
most famous communications, the “genocide fax,” he wrote about an informant who
reported that “he ha[d] been ordered to register all Tutsi in Kigali. He suspects it is for
their extermination. Example he gave was that in 20 minutes his personnel could kill up
to 1000 Tutsis.” Michael Dobbs, The Rwanda “Genocide Fax,” #RWANDA20YRS (Jan. 9, 2014),
available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB452/; see also ROMÉO
DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE FAILURE OF HUMANITY IN RWANDA (2004).
7. Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, BBC NEWS (Dec. 18, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1288230.stm.
8. MICHAEL BARNETT, EYEWITNESS TO A GENOCIDE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND
RWANDA 71, 143–44 (2002); SAMANTHA POWER, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL”: AMERICA AND
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Two decades later, the region remains in conflict spurred and
maintained in part by regional and international dynamics emerging
from the genocide.9
To date the two options described in the foregoing scenarios
have been the only ones open to any potential intervener concerned
to uphold international law yet faced with both massive human rights
abuses and an intransigent Security Council.
Law-abiding
interventionists in that situation face an impossible choice between
competing moral imperatives to respect the rule of law and to stop
atrocities.10
This Article offers a possible third option. Imagine that the next
time (and there will be a next time) a government kills and tortures
massive numbers of its own citizens while a paralyzed Security Council
sits passively by, the United States uses military force to stop the
atrocities notwithstanding its lack of authorization to do so. But
instead of leaving the issue of its unauthorized intervention
unresolved, the United States acknowledges its responsibility under
international law by accepting the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice (“ICJ”) for disputes arising from its actions. Imagine
further that in any proceedings in the ICJ the United States concedes
responsibility—acknowledges that its conduct amounted to an
internationally wrongful act—and only contests the amount of the
damages it might owe the opposing state. Then the ICJ, applying the
clean hands doctrine, finds that the state committing the atrocities
lacks the standing to recover damages and the United States pays
nothing. The differences between this scenario and the cases of Syria
and Rwanda are that the former two create a dilemma for
international law, tarnish the reputation of the United States
whichever path it takes, and diminish its ability to conduct effective

THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 334–35 (2002); Samantha Power,
MONTHLY, Sept. 2001, at 84, 86, 97–98. Five years after

Bystanders to Genocide, ATLANTIC
the genocide, former President
Clinton apologized directly to the people of Rwanda. John Ryle, A Sorry Apology from
Clinton,
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
13,
1998),
http://www.theguardian.com/Columnists/Column/0,5673,234216,00.html.
9. Chris McGreal, Rwanda’s Genocide and the Bloody Legacy of Anglo-American Guilt,
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
12,
2012),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/dec/12/rwanda-genocide-bloodylegacy-angloamerican-guilt; Jason K. Stearns, Rwandan Ghosts, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 29,
2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/29/rwandan_ghosts.
10. A potential intervener unconcerned with international law, or concerned with it
only as a suggestion to be taken up or not, would of course face no such choice. This
Article is not aimed at the unconcerned; rather, it assumes that states for the most part
wish to adhere to international law and certainly to refrain from undermining its central
tenets. For further discussion see infra Part II.E.
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foreign policy, while the latter solves that dilemma, preserves the
reputation of the United States, and gives it the moral high ground in
future debates about the appropriate use of force in defense of
human rights.
This Article offers a theory of international civil disobedience, or
principled disregard of international law, which may help solve the
dilemma that arises when egregious human rights abuses demand
military intervention to end them but the Security Council is
unwilling to issue legal authorization for that intervention. States
considering whether to intervene to stop such abuses seem to be in a
position to act morally or legally, but not both. Such situations pit
one set of moral intuitions (preserve life in the face of atrocities)
against another (uphold the rule of law).
Both choices risk damage to the intervening state’s international
reputation and undermine its ability to secure, in the medium and
long term, the very legal and moral interests that underlie the
dilemma. Choosing to ignore moral imperatives and follow the law
(by not intervening) would de-legitimize international law, showing it
to be a system unable to implement the fundamental principles on
which it claims to be based.11 Yet choosing to ignore the law and
follow moral imperatives (by intervening) would undermine one of
the foundational norms of modern international law by subordinating
the prohibition of the use of force to the non-legal judgments of
states. That prohibition is the cornerstone of a modern international
order which privileges diplomacy and the peaceful settlement of
disputes over violence. In that respect the modern system is rightly
viewed by many as a watershed in human development. It replaced
law permitting the waging of war as a way to vindicate states’
international legal rights or even to pursue their political agendas.12
11. In his retrospective on recourse to force published shortly after the NATO
bombing of Kosovo, Tom Franck likened this result to the one where a child, forbidden by
his father to see a neighbor boy, nonetheless saves the neighbor from drowning one
afternoon and is severely punished for disobeying his father. “Law—or, in this example,
parental authority—does not thrive when its implementation produces reductio ad
absurdum: when it grossly offends most persons’ common moral sense of what is right.”
THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED
ATTACKS 178 (2002).
12. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries states enjoyed unfettered
discretion under international law to make war for any reason or for no reason. Before
that, the legality of war was governed by the labyrinthine and easily manipulated jus ad
bellum, which, among other things, allowed a state whose international legal rights had
been infringed upon to resort to the use of force as a form of “self-help.” The adoption of
the U.N. Charter marked the transition from the system of self-help and the use of force as
punishment to a system of diplomacy and the use of force as a last resort. Gabriella Blum,
The Crime and Punishment of States, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 57, 63, 70, 72 (2013).
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Choosing to intervene would also give fodder to the argument that
international law as a system lacks the ability to ensure compliance
and is therefore more a disguise for power than it is a kind of law.13
This Article takes it as a given that situations horrifying enough
to prompt calls for military intervention will continue to arise. For
the first several decades of the Charter era, unauthorized intervention
was rare.14 But since the end of the Cold War, several states have
undertaken unauthorized military interventions, including the
United States, France, and the United Kingdom in northern Iraq in
1991;15 the decade-long ECOMOG operation in Sierra Leone and
Liberia;16 the NATO air campaign in Kosovo in 1999;17 the U.S.-led
invasion of Iraq in 2003;18 the Russian attacks in Georgia in 2008;19
and the U.S. intervention in Libya in 2011. The United States was
within a hair’s breadth of launching an attack on Syria before Russia
brokered a diplomatic solution. Although that diplomatic solution
seems to have held, at least with respect to the United States attacking
the state of Syria, at the time of this writing the United States is

13. David J. Bederman, Constuctivism, Positivism, and Empiricism in International Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 469, 473 (2001) (“All that matters, according to the realists (whether classical or
structural), is power. In their view, legalities can never constrain power.”); Claire R. Kelly,
Realist Theory and Real Constraints, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 545, 562–63 (2004) (“Without
guaranteed enforcement by an international sovereign, states must preserve their relative
power or risk increasing insecurity. There may be rules or law to which nations subscribe,
but, as the theory goes, ultimately powerful nations will avoid complying with rules that
diminish their relative power.”).
14. See SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? (2001); FRANCK, supra note 11;
Tonny Brems Knudsen, The History of Humanitarian Intervention: The Rule or the
Exception? 33 (Feb. 15, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Aarhus
University Department of Political Science and Government), available at
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p370801_index.html.
15. See generally Matthew C. Cooper, A Note to States Defending Humanitarian Intervention:
Examining Viable Arguments Before the International Court of Justice, 40 DENV. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 167, 187 (2012); No Fly Zones: The Legal Position, BBC NEWS (Feb. 19, 2001),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1175950.stm.
16. Cooper, supra note 15, at 187; Waging War to Keep the Peace: The ECOMOG
Intervention and Human Rights, 5 HUM. RTS. WATCH REP. 155–62 (1993), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/liberia/.
17. Cooper, supra note 15, at 190; Colum Lynch & Karen DeYoung, U.S. Explores
Possible Legal Justifications for Strike on Syria, WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-explores-possible-legaljustifications-for-strike-on-syria/2013/08/28/0d9c6c08-0fe3-11e3-bdf6e4fc677d94a1_story.html.
18. Lynch & DeYoung, supra note 17.
19. This example may strike some readers as anomalous. For additional discussion
see infra note 129 and accompanying text.
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conducting airstrikes within Syrian territory, aimed at the insurgent
group ISIS.20
Nor is Syria the only place where civilians are suffering massive
human rights violations at the hands of their government. At the end
of 2013, reports of ethnically motivated massacres of civilians surfaced
in South Sudan21—a country of significant strategic interest to the
United States.22 In the Central African Republic, governmentaffiliated Muslim militias initiated ethnic and religious violence which
has spiraled out of control and brought the country to the brink of
chaos.23 The U.S. government is increasingly taking the position that
such atrocities are a threat to its own national security.24
Taking future unauthorized intervention as a given, this Article
discusses not whether it is, or can be, the right option but rather
whether the inevitable practice can be understood in a way that has
the least impact on either the vitality of the prohibition of the use of
force or the legitimacy of international law. Commentators have
20. Anne-Marie Slaughter in Davos: Middle East Diplomacy Must be Backed by Threats of
Force,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Jan.
24,
2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/24/anne-marie-slaughter-davos-middle-eastdiplomacy_n_4659428.html.
21. South Sudan: Ethnic Targeting, Widespread Killings, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 16,
2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/16/south-sudan-ethnic-targeting-widespreadkillings.
22. The United States has been a strong supporter of South Sudan through three
successive Presidents. Rebecca Hamilton, U.S. Played Key Role in Southern Sudan’s Long
Journey
to
Independence,
ATLANTIC
(July
9,
2011),
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/07/us-played-key-role-insouthern-sudans-long-journey-to-independence/241660/.
The support springs from
several key strategic and political interests, including promoting a Western-leaning,
democratic country in a largely undemocratic region of the world; protecting the
predominantly Christian population of the South from religious persecution by the mostly
Muslim population of the North; protecting the overwhelmingly black African population
of the South from the Arab-identified elites in the North; and ensuring access to South
Sudan’s significant oil reserves. For an excellent overview of how all these issues were at
stake in Sudan’s Civil War, see INT’L CRISIS GRP., GOD, OIL, AND COUNTRY (2002), available
at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-ofafrica/sudan/God%20Oil%20and%20Country%20Changing%20the%20Logic%20of%20
War%20in%20Sudan.pdf.
23. Divya Avasthy, Central African Republic Ethnic Conflict Claims More Lives, INT’L BUS.
TIMES (Feb. 1, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/central-african-republic-ethnic-conflictclaims-more-lives-1434733.
24. Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 111th Cong. 37 (2010)
(statement of Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence) (mass killing as national
security threat); see also Michael Abramowitz & Lawrence Woocher, How Genocide Became a
National
Security
Threat,
FOREIGN
POL’Y
(Feb.
26,
2010),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/26/how_genocide_became_a_national_
security_threat.
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raised several strong objections to unauthorized military
intervention—even for humanitarian reasons. From the political
science perspective, there is evidence that intervention in civil wars
prolongs rather than abbreviates those wars.25 As the war in Iraq
amply demonstrated, military action can have unintended
consequences. That is true even where the intervening state has the
best of intentions; yet many would doubt the good intentions of the
United States and other strong, interventionist states.26 Evaluating
those salient objections is outside the scope of this Article, which
places itself firmly in the realm of non-ideal theory: how can
unauthorized military intervention best fit with other permanent
features of the international system such as the prohibition on the use
of force and the rule of international law?
To accomplish that, this Article will formulate a theory of
principled disregard of international law (or international civil
disobedience) under which an intervening state could simultaneously
violate and uphold international law. Part II will use the recent
example of Syria to illustrate the dilemma that arises from the moral
case for military intervention and the legal case against such
intervention absent Security Council authorization. Part III will begin
to solve that dilemma by offering a theory of international civil
disobedience that requires publicity, conscientiousness, a preference
for non-violence, and acceptance of legal consequences. Part IV will
then provide a blueprint for a civilly disobedient military intervention
and consider some potential objections and implications.
II. STOPPING ATROCITIES, RESPECTING THE RULE OF LAW: ONE OR THE
OTHER?
The recent example of Syria shows that sometimes military
intervention is morally desirable but nonetheless illegal under
25. Patrick M. Regan, Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts, 46
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 55 (2002); Ibrahim A. Elbadawi & Nicholas Sambanis, External
Interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars 10 (World Bank Working Paper Series, Mar. 18–
19, 2000), available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-2433.
The increase in human suffering of a prolonged war would seem to cut against the stated
benefits of humanitarian intervention.
26. Russia and China have certainly taken the position that the United States is
coming to the table with unclean hands. Bernard Gwertzman, Why Russia Won’t Yield on
Syria, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 17, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/russianfederation/why-russia-wont-yield-syria/p28712; Holly Yan, Syria Allies: Why Russia, Iran and
China
Are
Standing
by
the
Regime,
CNN
(Aug.
29,
2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/29/world/meast/syria-iran-china-russia-supporters/;
see
also Noam Chomsky, Gifford Lecture at the University of Edinburgh: Illegal but Legitimate A
Dubious Doctrine for the Times, YOUTUBE (Mar. 22, 2005), http://youtu.be/xEvIDiVheys.
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international law. The United States chose not to bomb Syria in 2013,
instead accepting a diplomatic solution that involved inspecting and
destroying Syria’s chemical weapons.27 But the events of 201328 in
Syria focused the attention of the world to a rare degree on related
questions of international law and political morality: could the use of
force by the United States against Syria be legally justified? Morally?
What if there were a moral justification without a legal one? Several
answers to those questions were offered by the Obama administration,
its allies, and supporters of intervention from the academy and civil
society. Perhaps the prohibition of the use of force is not as absolute
as is commonly believed.29 Or maybe the dysfunction of the Security
Council, in the form of a near-certain veto by Russia and China,
would somehow permit a member state to exercise the Council’s
obstructed authority.30 What of humanitarian intervention to protect
the rights of Syria’s dying and displaced civilians?31 Or punishment

27. See Anne Barnard, Syria Destroys Chemical Sites, Inspectors Say, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/01/world/middleeast/syria.html (reporting on
weapons inspectors’ confirmation that Syria’s ability to produce chemical weapons was
destroyed, as well as the “unexpectedly robust cooperation” by Assad’s government “with a
Russian-United States accord to dismantle his arsenal”); see also Giada Zampano, Italy Picks
Port for Transit of Syria Chemical Weapons, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2014),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579324670785232180
(describing the final plans for the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, brought to
international waters aboard Danish and U.S. vessels). The prospect of an attack is not,
however, over. Recall that weapons inspections began in Iraq in late 2002. Although Iraq
cooperated with the inspectors, the American-led military coalition invaded only four
months later. Iraq WMD Timeline: How the Mystery Unraveled, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 15,
2005), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4996218.
28. The events of 2014 present somewhat different questions. See supra note 3.
29. Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention (Part II:
International Law and the Way Forward), JUST SECURITY (Oct. 2, 2013),
http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/02/koh-syria-part2/.
30. See Jonathan Easley, Power Assails ‘Paralyzed’ U.N. in Making Case for Strike, THE HILL
(Sept. 6, 2013), http://thehill.com/policy/international/320765-power-assails-paralyzedun-in-making-case-for-unilateral-military-strike (“President Obama’s ambassador to the
United Nations on Friday laid out the administration’s case for a ‘swift, limited and
proportionate strike’ in Syria, stressing that the United States was forced to act on its own
because the U.N. was powerless in the face of opposition from Russia and China.”).
31. See Lynch & DeYoung, supra note 17 (“French President François Hollande
invoked the responsibility-to-protect doctrine in making his case to ‘punish those who took
the decision to harm the innocent.’”); see also PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE, 10 DOWNING
STREET, CHEMICAL WEAPON USE BY SYRIAN REGIME: UK GOVERNMENT LEGAL POSITION
(2013),
available
at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/235098
/Chemical-weapon-use-by-Syrian-regime-UK-government-legal-position.pdf (“[T]he legal
basis for military action would be humanitarian intervention; the aim is to relieve
humanitarian suffering by deterring or disrupting the further use of chemical weapons.”).
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for Syria’s violation of the ban on chemical weapons?32 Despite the
moral imperative to save Syrian civilians from further harm, none of
these theories offer adequate legal justification for an attack.
A. World in Progress: The Changing Dynamics of Sovereignty and the
Case for (Occasional) Intervention
International law is in the process of adapting to contemporary
challenges to the foundational norm of the Charter system, which
prohibits the use of force except in self-defense or when force is
authorized by the Security Council (and, by extension, conforms with
the political desires of the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, Russia, and China, each of which wields a veto in the
Council). But the pace of international legal change is measured in
decades at its fastest. In the meantime states are left with legal tools
that are inadequate for addressing many, if not most, of the situations
in which states might consider the use of force. Thus, international
law is shut out of the discourse on issues of global importance; and
the design of appropriate legal doctrines is paralyzed. The morality
and utility of military intervention, whether authorized by the Security
Council or not, are hotly contested.33
Certainly paper-thin
contentions of humanitarian concern have been used as justification
for self-interested and ultimately devastating military adventures.
Notable in this regard are the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Russia’s
interventions in Georgia in 2008 and the Ukraine in 2014, and
NATO’s exercise in regime change in Libya in 2011. Other
interventions have met with more approval. NATO’s air campaign in
Kosovo, albeit unauthorized, was warmly welcomed by the majority of
Kosovar Albanians (who continue to approve of the U.S. government
at among the highest rates in the world).34 The operation of

32. It is imperative to note here that the ban on the stockpiling and use of chemical
weapons arises from the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Syria was not a party at
the time. Conventional wisdom holds that the ban has risen to the level of customary
international law. Customary International Humanitarian Law Database: Rule 74. Chemical
Weapons, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule74 (last visited Oct. 9, 2014). However, no authoritative
determination—opposable to Syria—has even been made to that effect. See infra Part II.D.
33. See generally RICHARD FALK, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND LEGITIMACY WARS:
SEEKING PEACE AND JUSTICE IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2015). I am grateful to Richard Falk
for providing me with an early draft of his manuscript and to my colleague Burns H.
Weston for bringing it to my attention.
34. CYNTHIA ENGLISH & JULIE RAY, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA LEADS WORLD IN U.S.
APPROVAL,
GALLUP
GLOBAL
REP.
(2010),
available
at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/134102/sub-saharan-africa-leads-world-approval.aspx.
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ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone35 and the defense of the Kurds
by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France after
Operation Desert Storm are examples of interventions that were, if
not totally uncontroversial, better regarded than others and that
seemed, partially at least, to achieve the humanitarian objectives they
set out. The increasing prominence of human rights discourse, the
fraying of state sovereignty in the aftermath of the Cold War, and the
concomitant rise of non-state actors, undermined the status quo. For
most of the Charter era, powerful states occasionally engaged in
military diplomacy and the international community granted the
intervention greater or lesser degrees of approval or approbation,
thereby establishing an informal system of judgment and precedent.36
But the stakes have been raised in two important ways which,
although pulling in different directions, each call into question the
continued viability of the present system for managing the
international use of force. The first is the rise of human rights. Since
the entry into force of the first major international human rights
treaties in 1976,37 human rights have gained prominence in world
affairs. That trend has culminated in calls from powerless and
powerful states alike for the use of all available measures, including
force if necessary, to protect individuals from massive human rights
violations perpetrated by their governments. This is a complete
inversion of the relative weights assigned to human rights on the one
hand, and international peace and security on the other, in the U.N.
Charter. While it mentioned human rights as a guiding principle, the
Charter and the institutional apparatus of the U.N. was
predominantly dedicated to managing the use of force by member
states. The second important trend in this regard is the fraying of the
international political order held together by the tensions of the Cold
War. That tension released, arbitrary borders drawn by colonial and
imperial powers are being challenged by sub- and supra-state entities
claiming group identities of sufficient strength and legitimacy to
justify violent self-determination.
Unsurprisingly, religion and

35. See generally ADEKEYE ADEBAJO, BUILDING PEACE IN WEST AFRICA: LIBERIA, SIERRA
LEONE, AND GUINEA-BISSAU (2002).
36. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS
AND ARMED ATTACKS 162 (2002) (describing interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone as
demonstrating “the reticent UN system’s increasing propensity to let regional
organizations use force, even absent specific prior Security Council authorization, when
that seemed the only way to respond to impending humanitarian disasters”).
37. See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
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ethnicity play a large role in such claims, from South Sudan to the
former Yugoslavia, to Syria and Iraq.
International law should constrain the power of states, restrain
their worst impulses to visit violence and injustice on one another and
on their citizens, and provide both practical and normative guidelines
for peaceful coexistence. The existing system tried to do just that, by
outlawing what the architects of the Charter system understood as the
main threat to international peace and security—classical interstate
violence—and by funneling the remaining choices through the
political preferences of the permanent members of the Security
Council. But that simple, blanket prohibition is inadequate today.
To meet the new challenges posed by the demand for the protection
of human rights and by frayed sovereignty, international law needs to
develop a more nuanced, case-by-case approach that can provide
answers to important questions. Can interventions ever be justified?
If so, what is a good intervention and what is a bad one? Current
international legal discourse fails to address these questions because it
is forced into the constricting binaries of self-defense vs. aggression
and unauthorized vs. authorized. International lawyers therefore
cede ground to politicians, philosophers, and political theorists in
debates about some of the most important issues facing international
society. Notions such as “illegal but legitimate,” first deployed in the
aftermath of the NATO intervention in Kosovo and recently revived
with regard to Syria, can be read as attempts to escape the
straightjacket of the Charter system and to regain for international
law some of the ground it has lost. But such attempts fall flat since
they ultimately set aside international law as normatively inferior to
whichever system was understood to produce the kind of legitimacy
that could withstand illegality. Another such escape attempt is the
development of the principle of the responsibility to protect (“R2P”).
But while a review of the history of R2P makes a strong case that the
international community is developing a consensus about the need
to, in extreme circumstances, use force to stop massive human rights
abuses, that consensus has yet to coalesce in to legal rules.
International law may yet incorporate R2P or some other set of
principles that provide adequate guidance to states, but until that
happens, the competition between the Charter rules and
contemporary realities will continue to pose a dilemma for states. It is
that dilemma that this Article attempts to address, in a way that helps
resolve the tension between the duty to uphold the rule of law and
the duty to stop massive violations of human rights.
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The conflict in Syria is precisely the kind of disaster that gives rise
to moral reasons to intervene according to the emerging consensus
on humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect. Since
the conflict in Syria began in March of 2011, more than 140,000
people have reportedly been killed,38 including more than 11,000
children.39 Children, including infants, have been targeted by
snipers, summarily executed, and tortured.40 While many of the dead
were fighting either for or against the Syrian regime, some estimates
place the number of civilian dead at more than fifty percent of the
total, or more than 71,000.41 In August of 2013, the Syrian regime
killed nearly 1,500 civilians with poison gas.42 Credible evidence
suggests that the Syrian regime systematically tortured, starved, and
executed at least 11,000 people, then fabricated evidence that they
died in hospitals.43
For those left alive the situation is grim. Both the regime and the
opposition are using thirst, starvation, and homelessness as weapons
of war.44 At the time of this writing, the Syrian civil war has produced
38. Erika Solomon, Syria’s Death Toll Now Exceeds 140,000: Activist Group, REUTERS
(Feb.
15,
2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/15/us-syria-crisis-tollidUSBREA1E0HS20140215. That number was provided by an activist group, the Syrian
Observatory for Human Rights. Id. The United Nations stopped issuing casualty estimates
in the summer of 2013 due to the difficulty of obtaining accurate data. Laura Stampler,
U.N.
to
Stop
Updating
Syria
Death
Toll,
TIME
(Jan.
7,
2014),
http://world.time.com/2014/01/07/un-to-stop-updating-syria-death-toll.
39. HAMIT DARDAGAN & HANA SALAMA, OXFORD RESEARCH GRP., STOLEN FUTURES:
THE HIDDEN TOLL OF CHILD CASUALTIES IN SYRIA 3 (2013), available at
http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers_and_reports/stol
en_futures.
40. Id. at 13.
41. More than 140 Thousands Have Died Since the Beginning of the Syrian Revolution,
SYRIAN OBSERVATORY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Feb. 15, 2014), syriahr.com/en/ (page
removed, on file with author). One should note these numbers have not been
independently verified. See id. However they have still been reported in news outlets. See,
e.g., Solomon supra note 38.
42. Joby Warrick, More Than 1,400 Killed in Syrian Chemical Weapons Attack, U.S. Says,
WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/nearly-1500-killed-in-syrian-chemical-weapons-attack-ussays/2013/08/30/b2864662-1196-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html.
43. DESMOND DE SILVA ET AL., CARTER-RUCK & CO., A REPORT INTO THE CREDIBILITY
OF CERTAIN EVIDENCE WITH REGARD TO TORTURE AND EXECUTION OF PERSONS
INCARCERATED BY THE CURRENT SYRIAN REGIME 4–21 (Jan. 2014), available at
http://www.carter-ruck.com/Documents/Syria_Report-January_2014.pdf.
The report
concludes that “[t]he inquiry team is satisfied that upon the material it has reviewed there
is clear evidence, capable of being believed by a tribunal of fact in a court of law, of
systematic torture and killing of detained persons by the agents of the Syrian government.”
Id. at 21.
44. See U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Deprival of Food, Water,
Shelter and Medical Care—A Method of War in Syria, and a Crime Against Humanity
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10.8 million people in need of humanitarian assistance inside Syria,
including nearly 6.5 million internally displaced persons,45 and sent
2.9 million refugees fleeing to neighboring countries.46
U.S.
Ambassador Samantha Power remarked to the Security Council in
February of 2014 that “[i]n Syria we are witnessing the worst
humanitarian crisis we have seen in a generation.”47
But Syria is not the first conflict that has generated calls for
intervention to protect innocent civilians. At the end of the 1990s—a
decade marked by ethnic cleansing and rape camps in the Former
Yugoslavia, genocide in Rwanda, and still more ethnic cleansing in
Kosovo—the international community began to pay serious attention
to the circumstances under which states should be called upon to use
force to stop another state from killing and torturing its citizens. As
then-Secretary General Kofi Annan remarked, “[I]f humanitarian
intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how
should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and
systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our
common humanity?”48
It is sometimes difficult to recall because of the extraordinary rise
to prominence of human rights, but at the inception of the United
Nations they were a secondary, albeit important, concern.49 State
sovereignty, sovereign equality, and the elimination of war as a tool of

(Feb.
6,
2014),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14224&LangI
D=E (“Numerous cases show that government and pro-government forces as well as armed
opposition groups are impeding humanitarian relief to populations facing extreme
deprivation, including children, women, older persons, persons with disabilities, the
chronically sick, and civilians and persons hors combat held in detention . . . . Apart from
obstructing humanitarian access through sieges and tight check-points, attacks have been
carried out to destroy harvests, kill livestock, and cut off water supplies, with the apparent
aim of starving out the targeted populations, the experts noted.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
45. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Syria Crisis,
http://syria.unocha.org (last visited Oct. 4, 2014).
46. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Syria Regional Refugee Response,
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php (last updated Oct. 2, 2014).
47. Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N., Ambassador Power:
In Syria We Are Witnessing the Worst Humanitarian Crisis in a Generation, Address
Before the Security Council Stakeout on Syria (Feb. 13, 2014), available at
http://geneva.usmission.gov/2014/02/14/ambassador-power-in-syria-we-are-witnessingthe-worst-humanitarian-crisis-in-a-generation.
48. KOFI A. ANNAN, “WE THE PEOPLES”: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE
21ST
CENTURY
48
(2000)
(emphasis
added),
available
at
http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/We_The_Peoples.pdf .
49. CHESTERMAN, supra note 14, at 52–53 (quoting Fernando R. Tesón).
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foreign policy were much more prominent.50 Since then, however,
the plight of individual human beings faced with the implacable
power of a state bent on doing them harm has slowly become a
central preoccupation of the international community. Beginning
immediately after the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo, a number
of independent panels and commissions concluded that military
intervention to protect civilians from harm was a legitimate exercise
of the use of force. The first was Independent International
Commission on Kosovo chaired by Justice Richard Goldstone
(“Goldstone Commission”). The final report of the Goldstone
Commission was the first to coin the term “illegal but legitimate,”
which has regained currency in the debate about military intervention
in Syria.51 Among other things, the report suggested that the NATO
bombing of Kosovo was justified because of the long history of
oppression of Kosovar Albanians, and that the time had come to
revise international law and the intuitional framework of the U.N. to
permit future humanitarian intervention.52
The second was the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty (“ICISS”). In 2001 the ICISS—convened by
Canada and including representatives of a wide range of
governments—published its report on intervening for “human
protection.”53 The report attempted to offer a comprehensive take on
the legal, moral, operational and political issues at stake, and to
reflect the widest possible range of global perspectives.54 The ICISS
report identified an emerging moral and political principle that
“intervention for human protection purposes, including military
intervention in extreme cases, is supportable when major harm to
50. Id.
51. THE INDEPENDENT INT’L COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT 4 (2000),
available
at
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6D26FF88119644CFC1256989005
CD392-thekosovoreport.pdf.
52. See id. at 10 (“Experience from the NATO intervention in Kosovo suggests the
need to close the gap between legality and legitimacy. The Commission believes that the
time is now ripe for the presentation of a principled framework for humanitarian
intervention which could be used to guide future responses . . . and which could be used
to assess claims for humanitarian intervention.”).
53. INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO
PROTECT
2
(2001)
[hereinafter
ICISS],
available
at
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf .
54. Id. at vii. Note that this commission was made up of members from Australia,
Algeria, Canada, United States, Russia, Germany, South Africa, Philippines, Switzerland,
Guatemala, and India. Id. at 77–79. The ICISS was established by the government of
Canada. INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, PAMPHLET, available
at http://www.unitar.org/ny/sites/unitar.org.ny/files/69974_eng_175_lpi.pdf.
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civilians is occurring or imminently apprehended, and the state in
question is unable or unwilling to end the harm, or is itself the
perpetrator.”55 This principle is what the ICISS considered properly
termed “R2P.”56
The most important milestone in the development of the
principles of R2P was the adoption by the United Nations General
Assembly (“General Assembly”) of the 2005 World Summit Outcome.
The 2005 World Summit was a meeting of representatives, including
approximately 170 heads of state of the 191 (at the time) member
states of the United Nations.57 The issues considered at the summit
included, among others, collective security arrangements.58 The
plenary concluded that both individual states and the international
community as a whole bear the responsibility “to protect its
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity.”59 The General Assembly adopted the World
Summit outcome by consensus in October of 2005.60 Six months later
the Security Council adopted Resolution 1674 endorsing the World
Summit version of R2P.61
Many other reports, documents, and statements issued before
and since the World Summit confirm the consensus that civilians
must not be left to the less-than-tender mercies of their brutal and
oppressive governments.62 U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and
55. ICISS, supra note 53, at 16.
56. Id. at 15 (“While there is not yet a sufficiently strong basis to claim the emergence
of a new principle of customary international law, growing state and regional organization
practice as well as Security Council precedent suggest an emerging guiding principle—
which in the Commission’s view could properly be termed ‘the responsibility to
protect.’”).
57. The
2005
World
Summit,
UNITED
NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/worldsummit_2005.shtml (last visited Nov. 11,
2014) (“The 2005 World Summit, held from 14 to 16 September at United Nations
Headquarters in New York, brought together more than 170 Heads of State and
Government. It was a once-in-a-generation opportunity to take bold decisions in the areas
of development, security, human rights and reform of the United Nations.”).
58. Id.
59. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 138 U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1,
(Sept. 16, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/A-RES-60-1-E.pdf
60. Id.
61. S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 26, 2006), available at
http://www.un.org/docs/sc/unsc_resolutions06.htm (follow “S/RES/1674 (2006)”
hyperlink) (“Reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit
Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”).
62. U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Rep. of the
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ¶¶ 199–209, U.N. DOC. A/59/565 (Dec.
2, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/59/565 (follow
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his successor Ban Ki-moon have both publicly endorsed R2P.63 Both
the General Assembly64 and the Secretary General65 have continued to
be actively engaged in developing R2P principles.

“English” hyperlink). The Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change concluded that states could legitimately use force to protect civilians in other
states, as a last resort, provided that the threat was sufficiently serious, the intervention
narrowly tailored to address the threat, and the means proportional. Id. ¶ 201. Note that
this panel was made up of present and former government officials and ministers. See
ICISS, supra note 53, at 77 (listing the panel members).
63. In 2005, Annan urged a move toward R2P on the grounds that the United
Nation’s stated principles and common interests “demand no less.” U.N. SecretaryGeneral, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for all: Rep. of the
Secretary-General, ¶ 132, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005), available at http://daccessdds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/270/78/PDF/N0527078.pdf?OpenElement. In
2008 Ban Ki-moon took pains to note that R2P is not a western or northern intervention
imposed on the global south. Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary General
Defends, Clarifies ‘Responsibility to Protect’ at Berlin Event on ‘Responsible Sovereignty:
International Cooperation for a Changed World,’ U.N. Press Release SG/SM/11701 (July
15, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sgsm11701.doc.htm; see
also FRANCIS M. DENG ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN
AFRICA (1996). In 2009 Ki-moon further stated that all 192 member states share
responsibility in furthering the principles relating to R2P. U.N. Secretary-General,
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc.
A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) (“All Member States, not just the 15 members of the Security
Council, should be acutely aware of both public expectations and shared responsibilities.
If the General Assembly is to play a leading role in shaping a United Nations response,
then all 192 Member States should share the responsibility to make it an effective
instrument for advancing the principles relating to the responsibility to protect . . . .”).
64. The General Assembly held a debate on R2P on the 23rd, 24th, and 28th of July
2009 in which only four countries, Venezuela, Cuba, Sudan, and Nicaragua, challenged
R2P. UN General Assembly Debate on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 2009, GLOBAL
CTR.
FOR
THE
RESPONSIBILITY
TO
PROTECT
(Oct.
18,
2012),
http://www.globalr2p.org/resources/343. At the end of that debate the General
Assembly decided to keep investigating R2P and has since held several informal dialogues.
The Responsibility to Protect, G.A. Res. 63/308, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/308 (Oct. 7, 2009);
General Assembly Interactive Dialogue on Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to
Protect, INT’L COAL. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (Aug. 9, 2010),
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcstopics/2914-general-assembly-debate-on-early-warning-assessment-and-the-responsibility-toprotect; Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Role of Regional and Sub-regional Arrangements in
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, INT’L COAL. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
(July
12,
2011),
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcstopics/3566-general-assembly-interactive-dialogue-on-the-responsibility-to-protect;
UN
General Assembly Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response, INT’L
COAL.
FOR
THE
RESPONSIBILITY
TO
PROTECT,
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Brief%20Summary(3).pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2014);
United Nations General Assembly Holds Fifth Informal, Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to
Protect Focusing on the Theme of State Responsibility and Prevention, INT’L COAL. FOR THE
RESPONSIBILITY
TO
PROTECT,
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcs-
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Under any of the principles espoused at any time in the decadeplus of the development of R2P, the plight of the Syrian people would
justify intervention. To take the words of Secretary General Annan,
the effects of the Syrian civil war “offend[s] every precept of our
common humanity.”66 The Assad regime in Syria has been at least as
oppressive over at least as long a time as the Serbian regime in
Kosovo.67 “[M]ajor harm to civilians,” such as starvation, torture,
death, and displacement on unimaginable scales, “is [both] occurring
[and] imminently apprehended, and the state in question is . . . itself
the perpetrator,” as envisioned by the ICISS.68 The now-dominant
language of the World Summit establishes a responsibility to protect
populations from war crimes, among other things.69 Systematic
torture, targeting civilians, and siege warfare (denial of food, drink,
medical care, and shelter) are all war crimes under international
law.70 So why all the sound and fury? Why is international military
intervention controversial?
Because, as the remaining subsections below will show, military
intervention remains illegal under international law without the
authorization of the Security Council except in cases of self-defense.
And yet, the anemic legal implementation of R2P belies the strength
of the moral commitment that underpins the emerging consensus
that states must not be permitted to rape, torture, and slaughter their
citizens with impunity. That dissonance leads to the dilemma that
this Article seeks to address: to follow the strong moral consensus on
R2P at the cost of our moral commitment to the rule of law, or vice
versa?71 The following subsections will unpack the legal prohibition
topics/5004-united-nations-general-assembly-holds-fifth-informal-interactive-dialogue-onthe-responsibility-to-protect.
65. U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response: Rep. of
the Secretary-General, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/66/874-S/2012/578 (July 25, 2012), available at
http://undocs.org/A/66/874; U.N. Secretary-General, The Role of Regional and Subregional
Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 1, U.N.
Doc. A/65/877-S/2011/393 (June 28, 2011), available at http://undocs.org/A/65/877;
U.N. Secretary-General, Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the
Secretary-General, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/64/864 (July 14, 2010), available at
http://undocs.org/A/64/864.
66. ANNAN, supra note 48, at 48.
67. Mimi Dwyer, Think Bashar al-Assad Is Brutal? Meet His Family, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept.
8, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/114630/bashar-al-assad-syria-family-guide.
68. See ICISS, supra note 53, at 16.
69. 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 59, ¶ 138.
70. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
71. That tension is not lost on concerned observers of the crisis in Syria, and many
prominent voices have called for intervention notwithstanding its illegality. That cannot
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on the use of force, taking into account ultimately unconvincing
arguments offered by a number of commentators and officials that
international law does, in fact, permit intervention.
B. Parsing the Prohibition
Notwithstanding minority views to the contrary,72 the Charter of
the United Nations (“the Charter”) prohibits the unauthorized use of
force, even to stop mass atrocities.73 The Charter is generally
recognized as a watershed in humanity’s political development and as
the cornerstone of the international order established after World

be the solution, however, unless those same voices are content to participate in the erosion
of the prohibition on the use of force and the rule of international law. See John Irish,
France Says Would Be Hard to Bypass U.N. In Action Against Syria, REUTERS (Aug. 26, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/26/us-syria-crisis-franceidUSBRE97P04B20130826; see also David Bosco, Military Action in Syria as Reprisal, FOREIGN
POL’Y
(Aug.
25,
2013),
http://bosco.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/25/military_action_in_syria_as_reprisal#
sthash.ktyyxqXf.fRUuB1h5.dpbs (“But in a broader sense, Western governments would be
violating international law in order to defend it. More specifically, they would be skirting
the rules on when you can use force in order to defend a key norm of how parties may
fight: the ban on the use of chemical weapons.”); Michael Ignatieff, How to Save the Syrians,
NEW
YORK
REVIEW
OF
BOOKS
BLOG
(Sept.
13,
2013),
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/sep/13/how-save-syrians (“When legality
and legitimacy part company, as they have done in Syria, those who say strict legality must
prevail have an obligation to explain how this squares with morality, just as those say [sic]
that morality should prevail need to explain why they are justified in breaking the law.”);
Ian Hurd, Op-Ed., Bomb Syria, Even If It Is Illegal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/28/opinion/bomb-syria-even-if-it-is-illegal.html?_r=0
(advocating for “constructive noncompliance” which means recognizing that international
law is changing rather than advocating intervention on the basis of “legitimate but
illegal”); Rebecca Lowe, Syria: Military Intervention Is Illegal—But May Be Legitimate, INT’L
BAR
ASS’N
(June
9,
2013),
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=26cfd2b2-e6cf-4209-903c9327c76c9bd4 (showing that Former French Minister of Foreign and European Affairs
Bernard Kouchner believes that “legitimacy is often more important than legality” while
Current French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius believes that nations cannot completely
disregard international law).
72. See ANTHONY D’AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT (1987);
FERNANDO R. TESÓN, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY
24–25 (1988).
73. For a recent defense of this reading by Yale Law professors Oona Hathaway and
Scott Shapiro, see Oona A. Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, On Syria, a U.N. Vote Isn’t Optional,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/opinion/on-syria-a-unvote-isnt-optional.html?_R=0. See also JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th ed. 2013); Christine Gray, The International Court of Justice and the
Use of Force, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE (Christian J. Tams and James Sloan ed., 2013).
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War II.74 In Article 2, Paragraph 4, the Charter prohibits the use of
force among states.75 The Charter provides just two exceptions to this
blanket prohibition. One is the right to self-defense, articulated in
Article 51.76 The second is when the use of force is authorized by the
Security Council using what are commonly referred to as “Chapter
VII powers,” granted to it under Article 3977 and Article 42.78 As a
preliminary matter, the legality of any proposed military action by the
United States against Syria (or any future unauthorized military
intervention) should first be tested against the language of the
Charter.79
The prohibition on the use of force has reached the level of
customary international law.80 That view has been consistently upheld
by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).81 In Corfu Channel,82
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua,83 Armed

74. RAMESH THAKUR, NEW MILLENNIUM, NEW PERSPECTIVES: THE UNITED NATIONS,
SECURITY, AND GOVERNANCE 1–2 (2000).
75. U.N. Charter art. 2 para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.”).
76. Id. at art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right
of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any
way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or
restore international peace and security.”).
77. Id. at art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or
restore international peace and security.”).
78. Id. at art. 42 (“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action
by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace
and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by
air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.”).
79. This interpretation of the language of the Charter is not uncontested. Differing
interpretations will be addressed below. See infra notes 97–110 and accompanying text.
80. See Gray, supra note 73.
81. ICJ opinions, however, do not establish precedent and are only authoritative and
binding with respect to the specific dispute between the parties to a case. See infra notes
101–111 and accompanying text.
82. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9).
83. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 100, 118–19 (June 27).
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Activities on the Territory of the Congo,84 Legality of the Use of Force,85 and, to
a lesser extent, the advisory opinions Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons86
and Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,87 the ICJ
has established that the Article 2(4) prohibition is broad, does not
admit exceptions other than those listed in the Charter, and is a rule
of customary international law.88 The General Assembly has also
weighed in, with several resolutions intended to clarify and reinforce
the Charter’s ban on the use of force.89 Many commentators even
argue that it is a jus cogens norm.90
The Charter does not provide a legal justification for military
intervention in Syria—or anywhere else—unless in self-defense or
with authorization from the Security Council.91 Some commentators,
84. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
2005 I.C.J. 168, 223–24 (Dec. 19).
85. Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.), 1999 I.C.J. 124 (June 2); Legality of Use
of Force (Yugo. v. Can.), 1999 I.C.J. 259 (June 2); Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Fr.),
1999 I.C.J. 363 (June 2); Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Ger.), 1999 I.C.J. 422 (June 2);
Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. It.), 1999 I.C.J. 481 (June 2); Legality of Use of Force
(Yugo. v. Neth.), 1999 I.C.J. 542 (June 2); Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Port.), 1999
I.C.J. 656 (June 2); Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Spain), 1999 I.C.J. 761 (June 2);
Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. U.K.), 1999 I.C.J. 826 (June 2).
86. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 266 (July 8).
87. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 171 (July 9).
88. See infra Part II.C.
89. See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc.
A/8018, at 122–23 (Oct. 24, 1970); see also G.A. Res. 66/253, U.N. GAOR, 66th Sess., Supp.
No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/253, at 1 (Feb. 21, 2012).
90. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 146 (2d ed.
2006); LINDSAY MOIR, REAPPRAISING THE RESORT TO FORCE: INTERNATIONAL LAW, JUS AD
BELLUM AND THE WAR ON TERROR 9 (2010); Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of
Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (1999); Pamela J. Stephens, A Categorical
Approach to Human Rights Claims: Jus Cogens as a Limitation on Enforcement?, 22 WIS. INT’L L.J.
245, 253–54 (2004). But see James A. Green, Questioning the Peremptory Status of the
Prohibition of the Use of Force, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 215 (2011). It is worth noting in the
present context that the U.S. government itself referred to the prohibition as a jus cogens
norm in its submission to the ICJ in the Nicaragua case. Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). This Article need not
take a position on the issue, since the same argument applies whether the norm is
conventional, customary, or jus cogens.
91. See John D. Becker, The Continuing Relevance of Article 2(4): A Consideration of the
Status of the U.N. Charter’s Limitations on the Use of Force, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 583, 591
(2004); Sarah Mazzochi, Humanitarian Intervention in A Post-Iraq, Post-Darfur World: Is There
Now A Duty to Prevent Genocide Even Without Security Council Approval?, 17 ANN. SURV. INT’L &
COMP. L. 111, 123–24 (2011); Paul Campos, Striking Syria Is Completely Illegal, TIME (Sept. 5,
2013),
http://ideas.time.com/2013/09/05/obamas-plan-for-intervention-in-syria-isillegal/; Hathaway & Shapiro, supra note 73; Kevin Jon Heller, Four Thoughts on Koh’s
Defense of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 2, 2013),
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however, disagree with the standard reading and instead propose
either that Article 2(4), on its face, would permit the United States to
attack Syria, or that subsequent developments in customary
international law have created new legal exceptions to the rule.92
Supporters seeking to ground military intervention in international
law must therefore offer an affirmative case.
Some standard
arguments in that vein will be examined in the following paragraphs.
Arguments that Article 2(4), on its face, in fact permits
unauthorized military interventions differ slightly from one another,
but all flow from a misreading of the text, a disregard of drafting
history of the provision, and an inequitable weighting of subsequent
state practice.
The argument that the language of 2(4) permits some uses of
force rests on two key ambiguities in the text. First, is the operation
of “against the territorial integrity or political independence.”93
Second, is the phrase “or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.”94 In Article 2(4) the ‘active’ phrase
“Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force” is immediately followed by “against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state.”95 But 2(4) does not

http://opiniojuris.org/2013/10/02/four-thoughts-kohs-defense-unilateral-humanitarianintervention/; David Kaye, Harold Koh’s Case for Humanitarian Intervention, JUST SEC. (Oct.
7, 2013), http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/07/kaye-kohs-case/; Carsten Stahn, Guest Post:
On ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, ‘Lawmaking’ Moments and What the ‘Law Ought to Be’—
Counseling Caution Against a New ‘Affirmative Defense to Art. 2 (4)’ After Syria, OPINIO JURIS
(Oct. 8, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/10/08/guest-post-humanitarian-interventionlawmaking-moments-law-counseling-caution-new-affirmative-de/.
92. Most recently, Professor Koh advanced one such reading. Harold Hongju Koh,
Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention (Part II: International Law and the Way
Forward), JUST SEC. (Oct. 2, 2013), http://justsecurity.org/1506/koh-syria-part2/; see also
TESÓN, supra note 72; Jordan Paust, US Use of Limited Force in Syria Can be Lawful Under the
UN Charter, JURIST (Sept. 10, 2013), http://jurist.org/forum/2013/09/jordan-paust-forcesyria.php; Jennifer Trahan, Syria Insta-Symposium: Jennifer Trahan—The Legality of a U.S.
Strike on Syria, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 31, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/08/31/syriainsta-symposium-jennifer-trahan-legality-u-s-strike-syria/.
Tesón,
at
least,
has
acknowledged that his view is not widely shared. See Fernando Tesón, Syria and the Doctrine
of Humanitarian Intervention, BLEEDING HEART LIBERTARIANS (Sept. 2, 2013),
http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2013/09/syria-and-the-doctrine-of-humanitarianintervention/ (“Most international lawyers require United Nations Security Council
authorization as a condition for the lawfulness of action (not Congressional authorization,
which is irrelevant to international law.) I disagree, but mine is concededly a minority
view among international law scholars.”).
93. U.N. Charter art. 2 para. 4.
94. Id. The following discussion is adapted from the thorough treatment of this strain
of scholarship provided by Simon Chesterman. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 14.
95. U.N. Charter art. 2 para. 4.
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specify whether or how the latter modifies the former.96 Is it a nonexclusive list of types of force that, among all other types, are
prohibited? Or is it a restriction of the scope of the prohibition,
limiting it only to the use of force against either territorial integrity or
political independence? Both options require reading additional
words into the text. The former would read something like “All
Members shall refrain from the threat or use of force . . . including, but
not restricted to, the use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state” (“Option A”). The latter would be
something to the effect that “All Members shall refrain from the
threat or use of force . . . where such force is used against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state” (“Option B”).
Option B might permit humanitarian intervention as long as the
intention of the intervener is not to alter the boundary or change the
regime of the state it is attacking.97
The second ambiguity, the effect of “or in any other
manner . . . ,” is interpreted by proponents of a permissive standard as
both reinforcing the choice of Option B over Option A and providing
a criterion for uses of force endorsed by the Charter without
authorization and outside the enumerated exceptions of Article 51
and Chapter VII. In the former regard “or” completes the exclusive
series—as in, “shall not do X, Y, or Z” such that X, Y, and Z constitute
the entire universe of things prohibited.98 In the latter regard, the
“other” in “in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations” would characterize the entire list—and therefore the
entire Article—as prohibiting only inconsistent uses of force and

96. Id.
97. See generally TESÓN, supra note 72. Under this reading, a state could send tanks
and infantry across a border and—as long as the invading state did not intend to change
the boundary—that would not constitute a violation of the invaded state’s territorial
integrity. Or a state could shoot down the fighter planes of another state’s military—
fighter planes presumably carrying out the wishes of that state’s commander in chief—
without infringing on that state’s political independence. But see Oscar Schachter,
Editorial Comments, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 645, 649
(1984) (“The idea that wars waged in a good cause such as democracy and human rights
would not involve a violation of territorial integrity or political independence demands an
Orwellian construction of those terms. It is no wonder that the argument has not found
any significant support.”).
98. Paust, supra note 92 (“First, not every use of armed force is prohibited in the text
of Article 2(4) of the Charter, which expressly covers only three types of force: (1) that
used ‘against’ the ‘territorial integrity’ of a ‘state,’ (2) that used ‘against’ the ‘political
independence’ of a ‘state,’ and (3) that which is ‘in any other manner inconsistent with
the purposes of the United Nations.’”); see also Jordan J. Paust, Relative Sovereignty and
Permissible Use of Armed Force, 20 MICH. ST. U. COLL. L. INT’L L. REV. 1, 4 (2011); Jordan
Paust, Remembering Tom Franck, 104 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 409, 410 (2010).
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therefore, by implication, permitting consistent uses such as the
protection of the human rights of endangered civilians.99
While readings of “other” in this vein are frequently offered
alone, they are in fact dependent on choosing Option B over Option
A. If territorial integrity and political independence are understood
in the first place to be examples in a non-exhaustive list (Option A),
then it becomes very difficult to read “other inconsistent purposes” as
anything other than a third item in that (still) non-exhaustive list. It
is only choosing to characterize the list as exhaustive that opens the
question of what is permitted and thereby makes it possible to suggest
that states may use force in ways that are consistent with the purposes
of the Charter.
None of the foregoing readings survive close examination.
Certainly the text of 2(4) is ambiguous, and if that were the end of
the analysis then the international community would be left with
competing plausible interpretations and no way outside of
authoritative determination—as by a court—to decide between them.
Fortunately, international law provides guidance on dispelling that
ambiguity. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides
that, where the definitive meaning cannot be gleaned from the text,
recourse may be had to the drafting history and subsequent
practice.100
Furthermore, Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, which is commonly understood to be
an authoritative statement of the sources of international law,
provides that judicial decisions are a subsidiary means of determining
the law.101 Both the drafting history of Article 2(4) and the judicial
decisions of the ICJ on the use of force point unequivocally to Option
A, the reading of 2(4) as an expansive prohibition of all uses of force
save acts a) in self-defense; or, b) authorized by the Security

99. See Koh, supra note 92 (suggesting that “under certain highly constrained
circumstances a nation could lawfully use or threaten force for genuinely humanitarian
purposes”); TESÓN, LAW AND MORALITY, supra note 72.
100. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, ¶ 3, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (“There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) Any
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or
the application of its provisions; (b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) Any
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”).
101. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (“1. The Court, whose function is to
decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall
apply: . . . d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.”).
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Council.102 The following paragraphs will discuss the drafting history
of Article 2(4), and its interpretation in several judgments of the ICJ.
The subsequent practice of states will be addressed in subsection II.C
since it overlaps significantly with the question of whether a new rule
of customary international law has come into existence following the
adoption of the Charter.
The text originally proposed at Dumbarton Oaks in 1945 did not
contain the problematic phrases.103 To the contrary, it simply read,
“All members of the Organization shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the Organization.”104 The addition of the
“territorial integrity or political independence” language was the
result of an Australian amendment intended to give peace of mind to
smaller states by emphasizing the protection of their territorial
boundaries and political independence.105 These smaller states were
seeking to further emphasize the limitations on the power of larger
states to use force. The language was therefore intended to
emphasize rather than to limit the broad prohibition. For instance,
the Norwegian delegation—which was in favor of omitting the
reference—noted that “it should be made very clear in the Report to
the Commission that this paragraph 4 did not contemplate any use of
force . . . going beyond individual or collective self-defense.”106 The
U.S. delegation stated “that the intention of the authors of the
original text was to state in the broadest terms an absolute allinclusive prohibition; the phrase ‘or in any other manner’ was
designed to insure that there should be no loopholes.”107
Accordingly, one must either completely ignore or reinterpret the
102. As Secretary of State Kerry himself affirmed at his confirmation hearing when he
said, “I think a U.N. resolution is a necessary ingredient to provide the legal basis for
military action in an emergency.” Hearing on the Nomination of Massachusetts Democratic Sen.
John Kerry to Be Secretary of State: Hearing Before the S. Foreign Relations Comm., 113th Cong.
(2013), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/KerryConfirmation-Testimony.pdf.
103. CHESTERMAN, supra note 14, at 49.
104. Washington Conversations on International Peace and Security Organization,
Washington, D.C., Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization (Oct.
7, 1944), available at http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1944/441007a.html.
105. United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco,
Amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals Submitted on Behalf of Australia, 3 Doc. U.N.
Conf. on Int’l Org. 543 (May 5, 1945); IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE
OF FORCE BY STATES 267 (1963).
106. United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco,
Summary Report of Eleventh Meeting of Committee I/1, 6 Doc. U.N. Conf. on Int’l Org. 334–35
(June 5, 1945).
107. Id. at 335.
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drafting history of the Charter to arrive at a reading under which only
three restricted types of force are prohibited.
The prohibition on the use of force by states has been the subject
of several opinions issued by the ICJ, each of which emphasized the
broad nature of the norm.108 In the present context the opinion in
the Corfu Channel case is particularly relevant. There, the Court noted
that the prohibition on the use of force was not subject to
amendment by the later devised interventionist theories of states.109
In a passage that has been often quoted by both scholars and the
Court itself, the majority noted that
[t]he Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention
as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the
past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot,
whatever be the present defects in international
organization, find a place in international law. Intervention
is perhaps still less inadmissible in the particular form it
would take here; for, from the nature of things, it would be
reserved for the most powerful States, and might easily lead
to perverting the administration of international justice
itself.110
One aspect of the reasoning stands out here. The Court squarely
engaged the question of what happens when international
institutional arrangements fail to serve their intended purpose.
Today observers would point to the paralysis of the Security Council
even in the face of horrific, large-scale violations of rights as just such
a defect. The Court, however, was concerned that the outcome of
allowing states the freedom to intervene in the face of organizational
108. It should be noted that there is no stare decisis in international law and that,
formally, decisions of the ICJ are only binding with respect to the parties. They do not
provide precedent or establish authoritative determinations of international law.
Decisions of Courts, including the ICJ, are, according to the ICJ’s own statute, a subsidiary
means of establishing international law. In practice, however, decisions of the ICJ are
given considerable weight by tribunals the world over, and by the ICJ itself in future
matters. See generally Nathan Miller, An International Jurisprudence? The Operation of
“Precedent” Across International Tribunals, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 483 (2002); Christopher
Greenwood, The Role of the International Court of Justice in the Global Community, 17 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 233 (2011).
109. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 34–35 (Apr. 9). In so doing, the Court
expressly rejected the position of the United Kingdom (still advanced by some scholars)
that force that fell short of threatening the territorial integrity or political independence
of the target state did not run afoul of the Article 2(4) prohibition. See generally
Christopher Greenwood, The International Court of Justice and the Use of Force, in FIFTY YEARS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 373 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice
eds., 1996).
110. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 35.

2015]

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

341

deadlock would be a return to the “policy of force” that characterized
the pre-United Nations era.
The ICJ quoted the language from Corfu Channel in its Nicaragua
decision. There, far from limiting the prohibition on the use of
force, the Court arguably amplified it by determining that even
providing arms to groups using force against a sovereign constituted
the use of force against that state—even if the armed forces of the
supplying state never fired a single shot.111 Some of the Court’s
reasoning in the Nicaragua case is especially relevant to the question
of whether subsequent developments in customary international law
have superseded the broad prohibition in the Charter. These will be
discussed in greater detail below.112
Some would argue that state practice has shifted considerably
since the end of the Cold War, weakening the relevance of Cold Warera decisions. Yet in Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda, which was
filed in 2008, the Court had ample opportunity to consider
contemporary state practice and its potential impact on the nature of
customary law regarding the use of force. The Court in that case
again emphasized the customary nature of the prohibition on the use
of force and again put forward its reading of Article 2(4) as an
expansive prohibition.113
The International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case did,
however, leave open the possibility that future developments in
customary international law could supersede the prohibition on the
use of force found in the Charter. The Court noted that:
The significance for the Court of cases of State conduct
prima facie inconsistent with the principle of nonintervention lies in the nature of the ground offered as
justification. Reliance by a State on a novel right or an
unprecedented exception to the principle might, if shared
in principle by other States, tend towards a modification of
customary international law.114
111. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 15 (June 27).
112. See infra Part II.C.
113. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 148 (Dec. 19) (noting that “[t]he prohibition against the use of force is a
cornerstone of the United Nations Charter,” and that the Charter does not allow use of
force outside the strict confines of art. 51 in self-defense).
114. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 207.
The Court went on to note that no such shared principle was evident:
In fact however the Court finds that States have not justified their conduct by
reference to a new right of intervention or a new exception to the principle of its
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One could argue, based on that language, that the behavior of
powerful states could be sufficient to satisfy the first criterion (a
general practice) for a new rule of customary international law.
However, the Court noted that acts of intervention would not be the
only behavior relevant to the analysis.115 Also important would be the
reaction of states to such military interventions. Would they be
accepted? Or condemned? The following section will show that states
have developed no new general practice or opinio juris. Customary
international law on the use of force remains unmodified, and the
Charter’s prohibition unaltered.
C. Countervailing Custom?
A customary international legal rule permitting unauthorized
intervention could, based on the later-in-time principle, modify the
Charter prohibition, but no such rule has come into being. The
practice of the small minority of states that have engaged in
unauthorized military intervention cannot be sufficient to establish
the general practice required for the emergence of a new rule of
customary international law. Even if it could, the total absence of an
express belief among those states that their interventions were in fact
permitted under international law significantly undermines any claim
to the emergence of a new rule superseding the Charter prohibition
on the use of force. In contrast, the vast majority of states in the
world have clearly and consistently articulated their opinion that
military intervention absent Security Council authorization remains
illegal under international law.
The inconsistent, at best, opinio juris (see below) of
interventionist states must be understood in the context of the strong,
clear, and often-expressed opinion of the majority of states that such
conduct remains entirely prohibited by international law. In 1970,
the General Assembly passed a resolution which has come to be

prohibition. The United States authorities have on some occasions clearly stated
their grounds for intervening in the affairs of a foreign State for reasons
connected with, for example, the domestic policies of that country, its ideology,
the level of its armaments, or the direction of its foreign policy. But these were
statements of international policy, and not an assertion of rules of existing
international law.
Id.
115. Id. (“Either the States taking such action or other States in a position to react to it,
must have behaved so that their conduct is ‘evidence of a belief that this practice is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.’” (quoting North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 44, ¶ 77 (Feb. 20))).
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known as Friendly Relations. That resolution, passed unanimously,
declares:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene,
directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the
internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently,
armed intervention and all other forms of interference or
attempted threats against the personality of the State or
against its political, economic and cultural elements are in
violation of international law.116
Another important General Assembly resolution is the Definition
of Aggression. Adopted in 1974, the resolution endorses a definition of
aggression which specifies that “[t]he invasion or attack by the armed
forces of a State of the territory of another State . . . however
temporary” shall be considered an act of war.117 It further provides
that “[n]o consideration of whatever nature, whether political,
economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for
aggression.”118
More recently, in the aftermath of the NATO operation in
Kosovo, more than 130 states (approximately two thirds of all states in
the world) issued a declaration specifically denouncing the legality of
humanitarian intervention absent Security Council authorization:
We stress the need to maintain a clear distinction between
humanitarian assistance and other activities of the United
Nations. We reject the so-called “right” of humanitarian
intervention, which has no legal basis in the United Nations
Charter or in the general principles of international
law. . . . Furthermore, we stress that humanitarian assistance
should be conducted in full respect of the sovereignty,
territorial integrity, and political independence of host
countries, and should be initiated in response to a request
or with the approval of these States.119

116. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A.
Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8082, at 123 (Oct.
24, 1970) [hereinafter The Resolution].
117. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp.
No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9890, at 143 (Dec. 14, 1974).
118. Id.
119. Group of 77 South Summit, Declaration of the South Summit, GROUP OF 77 (Apr. 10–
14, 2000), http://www.g77.org/summit/Declaration_G77Summit.htm; see also Heller,
supra note 91 (discussing the Declaration of the South Summit).
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Yet many scholars contend that, since the adoption of the
Charter, a new rule of customary international law has come into
being. This new rule of customary international law supersedes the
prohibition on the use of force found in the Charter and permits
military interventionism.120 It is well settled under international law
that proving the existence of a rule of customary international law
requires showing a general practice of states and a belief by the states
that the practice is required by law (opinio juris).121 Both elements
must be satisfied; the absence of either a general practice or of a
belief that the general practice is required by law would seriously
hinder any effort to establish the existence of a new rule of customary
international law.122
The Vienna Convention provides that textual ambiguities may be
cured with reference to subsequent practice as well as to the drafting
history of the treaty in question. An examination of the subsequent
practice related to Article 2(4) will therefore serve both to cement the
broad reading of the prohibition on the use of force and to establish
that the text of the Charter has not been supplanted by subsequent
developments in customary international law.
The contention that a general practice has emerged since the
adoption of the charter relies on the interventionist track record of a
small handful of states. To paraphrase the famous aphorism of the
late Louis Henkin, most states mostly adhere to the prohibition on
the use of force most of the time.123
The vast majority of
unauthorized military interventions undertaken since the
establishment of the United Nations were conducted by the United
States and a handful of Western European states. Altogether, these
interventionist states account for, at most, ten percent of the states in
the world. To argue that the behavior of those states gives rise to the
“general practice” required for the establishment of a new rule of
customary international law is to argue that the behavior of the most

120. See MICHAEL J. GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER:
INTERVENTIONISM AFTER KOSOVO 2 (2001); see generally Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The
Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under
the U.N. Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 203 (1974).
121. ICJ Statute, supra note 101, 59 Stat. at 1060 (stating that the Court shall apply
“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”); see also JAMES
CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 23–30 (7th ed. 2008).
122. JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th
ed. 2013).
123. See LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed.
1979) (“It is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.”).
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powerful states in the world counts for more, much more, in the
development of customary international law then the behavior of the
entire rest of the world.124 Such an argument violates the principle of
sovereign equality and comes perilously close to substituting power
for the rule of law.
Even if one were to accept a theory of customary international
law under which the behavior of a small, but powerful, minority of
states was sufficient to establish a general practice, it would be almost
impossible to argue for the existence of opinio juris when even
interventionist states go out of their way to avoid declaring that their
interventions are in accordance with a new rule of international law.
The NATO operation in Kosovo is frequently cited by proponents of
an international law permitting intervention.125
However, the
position of the United States was made clear by Acting Senior Legal
Adviser to the U.S. State Department Michael Matheson. Speaking
on a panel at the meetings of the American Society of International
Law in 1999, Matheson said:
[M]any NATO states—including the United States—had not
accepted the doctrine of humanitarian intervention as an
independent legal basis for military action that was not
justified by self-defense or the authorization of the Security
Council.

124. Several scholars do advance such an understanding of the development of
customary international law, one that explicitly privileges the practice of a small group of
elite states. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 115, 146 (2005) (“Opinio juris refers to the beliefs of states that interact with a
potential violator. To the extent that these states believe there exists a legal obligation,
the potential violator faces a rule of [Customary International Law].”); Brigitte Stern,
Custom at the Heart of International Law, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 89, 108 (2001) (“[T]he
customary international rule is the one which is considered to be such by the will of those
states which are able to impose their point of view.” (emphasis omitted)).
125. See, e.g., Keith A. Petty, Humanity and National Security: The Law of Mass Atrocity
Response Operations, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 745, 799 (2013) (“Although contingent sovereignty
does not expressly authorize unilateral intervention to oust a sitting government, the
foundation is in place to justify such an action, not unlike the NATO intervention in
Kosovo in 1999.”); Ashley Deeks, Syria, Chemical Weapons, and Possible U.S. Military Action,
LAWFARE (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/12/syria-chemical-weaponsand-possible-u-s-military-action/#.UvpqW3k3-d8; Frances Gibb, Analysis: Kosovo a Legal
Precedent
for
Strike
on
Syria,
THE
TIMES
(Aug.
27,
2013),
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/law/article3853582.ece; Enver Hoxhaj, It’s 1999 in Syria,
FOREIGN
POLICY
(Aug.
23,
2013),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/23/it_s_1999_in_syria_kosovo_foreign_
minister_intervention; Mark Landler & Michael R. Gordon, Air War in Kosovo Seen as
Precedent in Possible Response to Syria Chemical Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/world/air-war-in-kosovo-seen-as-precedent-inpossible-response-to-syria-chemical-attack.html?pagewanted=all.
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....
This was a pragmatic justification designed to provide a
basis for moving forward without establishing new doctrines
or precedents that might trouble individual NATO members
or later haunt the Alliance if misused by others.126
Furthermore, of the states participating in the military campaign only
two have ever clearly stated their position that the intervention was
permitted under international law. The bombing of Kosovo gave rise
to proceedings in the ICJ. Only Belgium and the United Kingdom
argued that their actions were in conformity with international law.127
The rest, including the United States, declined to do so. Of all the
states in the world, only the United Kingdom has clearly and openly
articulated its view that international law permits military intervention
without
Security
Council
authorization
under
certain
128
circumstances.
Furthermore, interventionist states have harshly condemned the
same conduct when undertaken by others. In the conflict between
Russia and Georgia in 2008, for instance, Russia claimed to be acting
to protect the non-Georgian (Russian) minorities in South Ossetia
126. Michael J. Matheson, Justification for the NATO Air Campaign in Kosovo, 94 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 301, 301 (2000).
127. CHESTERMAN, supra note 14, at 46 (“In the joint hearings on the ten requests for
provisional measures, only Belgium presented a clear argument that its actions were
justified on the basis of a right of humanitarian intervention.”).
128. The Prime Minister’s Office of the United Kingdom published the following legal
opinion that sets out the U.K. Government’s position regarding the legality of military
action in Syria:
If action in the Security Council is blocked, the UK would still be permitted
under international law to take exceptional measures in order to alleviate the
scale of the overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe in Syria by deterring and
disrupting the further use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. Such a
legal basis is available, under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention,
provided three conditions are met:
(i) there is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international
community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale,
requiring immediate and urgent relief;
(ii) it must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use
of force if lives are to be saved; and
(iii) the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the aim
of relief of humanitarian need and must be strictly limited in time and scope to
this aim (i.e. the minimum necessary to achieve that end and for no other
purpose).
U.K. GOV’T, CHEMICAL WEAPON USE BY SYRIAN REGIME: U.K. GOVERNMENT LEGAL
POSITION
(Aug.
29,
2013),
available
at
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-ukgovernment-legal-position/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legalposition-html-version.

2015]

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

347

and Abkhazia from ethnic cleansing being undertaken by the
Georgian government.129 Georgia took the first shots. The Georgian
government had a long history of violent, racist rhetoric against nonGeorgian minorities, and the actual effect of the conflict was that
nearly half the minority population fled to Russia. Russia even went
to the Security Council, where it claimed that it had taken military
action in part to protect civilians, claims that were met with
skepticism.130
Many governments rejected Russia’s claims to legality.131 The
United States in particular was outraged, and strenuously defended
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia.132 It may very well
be that Russia acted in bad faith and that its claims to a humanitarian
justification for its military conduct were a smokescreen. This Article
does not take a position on that question, nor does it need to. The
relevance in the present context is that the condemnations issued by
the United States and other interventionist governments were not
framed as disagreements over whether the particular criteria that
characterize a customary international rule favoring intervention were
or were not met—as might have been expected if those countries
believed that such a law existed. Rather, the objections were couched
in the stark language of the Charter, the prohibition on the use of
force, and the fundamental principle of sovereign equality.
It should be clear from the discussion above that states
undertaking unauthorized military intervention have done so with an
almost deliberate lack of accompanying opinio juris. Hence it seems
difficult to argue that there has been any modification of the broad
customary international legal prohibition on the use of force that has
been noted and upheld time and again by the ICJ. The question then
129. Nicolai N. Petro, The Legal Case for Russian Intervention in Georgia, 32 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 1524, 1545 (2009).
130. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Holds Third Emergency
Meeting as South Ossetia Conflict Intensifies, Expands to Other Parts of Georgia, U.N.
Press
Release
SC/9419
(Aug.
10,
2008),
available
at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9419.doc.htm/ (“The Russian Federation
wondered whether the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ could be used to describe Georgia’s
actions. How many civilians had to die before it was described as genocide?”).
131. Hathaway & Shapiro, supra note 73.
132. See Remarks With French President Nicolas Sarkozy on the Situation in Georgia, DEP’T ST.
ARCHIVE
(Aug.
14,
2008),
http://20012009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/08/108254.htm. As Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice stated, “Too many innocent people have died and Georgia, whose territorial integrity
and independence and sovereignty we fully respect, must be able to get back to normal
life,” reasserting, “that the United States of America stands strongly, and the President of
France has just said, for the territorial integrity of Georgia. This is a member-state of the
United Nations whose internationally recognized boundaries have to be respected.” Id.
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arises whether, in the absence a new rule of customary international
law, some other basis in international law might be found. The
Obama administration has suggested that the Assad regime’s use of
chemical weapons might provide such a basis.
D. Resurrecting Reprisals
On September 10, 2013, President Barack Obama firmly
distanced himself from the few fragile threads his administration
might have used to fashion a justification under international law for
military intervention in Syria by advancing a legal theory apparently
based on the antiquated doctrine of reprisals. In his speech to the
American people that night, President Obama narrowly and
specifically advanced the use of chemical weapons by the Assad
regime as the reason for intervention, noting, “On that terrible night,
the world saw in gruesome detail the terrible nature of chemical
weapons, and why the overwhelming majority of humanity has
declared them off-limits—a crime against humanity, and a violation of
the laws of war.”133 He argued:
[I]t is in the national security interests of the United States
to respond to the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons
through a targeted military strike. The purpose of this strike
would be to deter Assad from using chemical weapons, to
degrade his regime’s ability to use them, and to make clear
to the world that we will not tolerate their use.134
By basing both the justification for intervention and its goals in terms
of chemical weapons, President Obama moved away from a theory of

133. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President in Address
to the Nation on Syria (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/09/10/remarks-president-address-nation-syria.
134. Id. The portion of his speech quoted above could be read as an entirely political
(or military) justification of intervention—one that ignored international law altogether.
However, in the past President Obama explicitly acknowledged that his decisions would be
driven, at least in part, by international law. And he relied heavily on the illegality of
chemical weapons under international law in other parts of his speech:
Because these weapons can kill on a mass scale, with no distinction between
soldier and infant, the civilized world has spent a century working to ban them.
And in 1997, the United States Senate overwhelmingly approved an
international agreement prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, now joined by
189 governments that represent 98 percent of humanity.
Id.
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humanitarian intervention. Instead, it seemed that he was attempting
to resurrect the doctrine of reprisals.135
Under pre-Charter international law, one way in which states
could lawfully use force against one another was to exercise their
right of armed reprisal in response to a violation of international law:
Reprisals in particular are a traditional act of self-help under
international law, consisting of a breach of international law
in response to a prior violation by another state and
undertaken for the purpose of enforcing compliance. They
are “unlawful acts that become lawful in that they constitute
a reaction to a delinquency by another State.”136
The enforcement aspect of that definition lends further support to
the contention that President Obama was advancing a theory based
on the doctrine of reprisals. Armed reprisals were understood to be a
form of law enforcement, a way for a state to exercise self-help in
response to a violation of its rights.137 As the Institut de droit
international put it in 1934: “Reprisals are measures of coercion,
derogating from the ordinary rules of international law, decided and
taken by a State, in response to wrongful acts committed against it, by

135. Shane Darcy, Retaliation and Reprisal, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF
FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Marc Weller ed., forthcoming 2015). Nor is President
Obama alone in that regard. Justice Goldstone believes:
In the present case, it could be argued that the military force is being used to
protect the people of Syria from the future use of chemical weapons. That
would very much depend on the efficacy of the force used and whether it would
indeed deter such future use of such weapons.
. . . If the intervention is calculated to prevent the future use of chemical
weapons by the Syrian Government and any future regimes that might consider
it, I would support such an intervention.
Lowe, supra note 71.
136. Darcy, supra note 135 (manuscript at 1) (quoting ANTONIO CASSESE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 299 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2d ed. 2005)).
137. Id. This Article takes the position that armed reprisals have been outlawed by the
Charter. See infra notes 142–148 and accompanying text. Hence a detailed discussion of
the nuances of that doctrine is beyond the scope of the present project. It is worth noting,
however, that for a state to acquire a right of armed reprisal the target state must first have
a) violated international law and, b) in so doing, injured the interests of the state
undertaking the reprisal. “Reprisals are acts which, although normally illegal, are
exceptionally permitted as reaction of one state against a violation of its right by another
state.” HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (7th ed. 2007). The question
of which rights of the U.S. Syria might have violated and the extent of the armed reprisals
authorized by that violation would require quite a bit of unpacking. One possible answer
would be legal obligations erga omnes (owed to the entire international community)
created by the ban on chemical weapons. See ANDRÉ DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS ERGA
OMNES AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: A THEORETICAL INQUIRY INTO THE IMPLEMENTATION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES (1996).
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another State, and intended to impose on it, by pressure exerted
through injury, the return to legality.”138
President Obama’s remarks did seem to emphasize the “law
enforcement” aspect of the intended intervention; he noted that
military action would specifically target the Assad regime’s ability to
use chemical weapons and deter future use.139
To be sure, the production, stockpiling, and use of chemical
weapons are illegal.140 This is true both under the Chemical Weapons
Convention to which Syria was not, at the time, a party and under
customary international law.141 Syria is bound by the latter, customary
international law, even if it has not ratified the former. It therefore
seems clear that Syria has violated its international legal obligations
several times over—in the production, the storage, and, finally, the
use of prohibited weapons.
But even with that being the case, international law simply has no
provision that allows for the use of force by one state, or even a group
of states, against another that has violated international law. That was
not always true. Before the Charter and the advent of the modern era
of international law, states commonly used force against one another
as a way to vindicate their rights under international law.142 The
Charter, however, represented a paradigm shift away from force and
punishment as the dominant modes of international relations and
towards a system defined by diplomacy and the peaceful settlement of
international disputes.143 To argue that the Charter permits armed
reprisals is to argue in favor of Option B described above, or the
position that the Charter sets out only a weak and limited prohibition
138. Darcy, supra note 135 (manuscript at 4) (quoting Institut de Droit International,
Session de Paris 1934, Régime de répresaillies en temps de paix, Article 1).
139. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 133.
140. Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012–2014, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N (Aug.
19,
2014),
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-ChemicalWeapons-Activity. On September 12, 2013, Syria:
[S]ent a letter to the United Nations Secretary General which said that Assad
signed a legislative decree providing the accession of Syria to the Chemical
Weapons Convention. In the letter, Assad said Syria would observe its CWC
obligations immediately, as opposed to 30 days from the date of accession, as
stipulated in the treaty.
Id.
141. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94
L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol].
142. Blum, supra note 12, at 58.
143. Id. at 73. Professor Blum documents the move from narratives of punishment to
ones of regulation and cooperation, then goes on to argue that the shift obscured the
persistence of the same forms of interstate relations.
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of the use of certain kinds of force.144 However, for the many reasons
outlined above, that reading is unsustainable. Furthermore, the
subsequent practice with regard to reprisals is very similar to the
practice with regard to the general use of force. Scholars,145 the
ICJ,146 the General Assembly,147 and the International Law
Commission148 have all indicated that armed reprisals have no basis in
contemporary international law. And there are even fewer examples
of state practice characterized as reprisals than there are of attacks
with other claimed justifications.149
The preceding Sections show the dilemma posed by the
professed commitment of the international community to use force in
situations, like the Syrian civil war, where states torture and kill
massive numbers of their own citizens, and the persistent illegality of
such uses of force. One way around that dilemma is to define it away.
E. More of a Guideline, Really
The argument offered in this Article assumes that states prefer to
act according to international law; that law, even international law,
constrains behavior (in this case of states); that international law has
entered a “post-ontological era” where its existence as “real” law need
no longer be defended;150 that states and the international legal
system derive reciprocal legitimacy from behavior by states in
conformity with the law.151 Furthermore, this Article aligns itself with
the strain of thinking that the United States harms its standing in the
world and its ability to achieve its medium- and long-term interests
144. Supra Part II.A.
145. JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 415 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed.
1963); CRAWFORD, supra note 121, at 466; GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, in 2 THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT 58 (1968); Antonio Cassese, Return to Westphalia? Considerations on the Gradual
Erosion of the Charter System, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE
505, 514 (Antonio Cassese ed. 1986); Darcy, supra note 135.
146. Darcy, supra note 135 (manuscript at 16).
147. Id. (manuscript at 14–15).
148. Id. (manuscript at 17–18).
149. Id. (manuscript at 20) (“There are a few isolated examples, but nothing
approaching a widespread practice, and states invariably justify unilateral actions under
self-defence, rather than reprisals.”).
150. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 6 (1995)
(“With new opportunities come new challenges! The questions to which the international
lawyer must now be prepared to respond, in this post-ontological era, are different from
the traditional inquiry: whether international law is law. Instead, we are now asked: is
international law effective? Is it enforceable? Is it understood? And, the most important
question: Is international law fair?”).
151. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990).
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when it distances itself from multilateral institutional arrangements in
pursuit of short-term goals.152
Some scholars, and perhaps many officials in the governments of
strong states, would view such assumptions as misguided. They would
characterize over-reliance on the language of the Charter, the equal
reliance on opinio juris and state practice, and the insistence on
giving similar weight to the practices of states small and large as
characteristic of international legal formalism derived from a
vanished Westphalian world.153 Critics of formalism offer instead an
instrumental conception of international law as an open system, one
in which legal texts are the beginning but not necessarily the end of
the conversation.154 On that account, power and international

152. MULTILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: AMBIVALENT ENGAGEMENT (Stewart
Patrick & Shepard Forman eds., 2002). Kenneth Anderson notes the dependence of the
success of extra-Charter policies like “illegal but legitimate” on the absence of opposition,
on “a residual, hopeful belief left over from 1990 that the great powers . . . were in
essential agreement on such things as mass atrocities.” Kenneth Anderson, Legality of
Intervention in Syria in Response to Chemical Weapon Attacks, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS
(Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/21/legality-interventionsyria-response-chemical-weapon-attacks. He goes on to argue that the United States can
no longer count on such acquiescence:
In retrospect, it would probably be more accurate to say that Russia correctly
perceived that it lacked the real power to contest Kosovo and simply let it go—
without, however, much forgiving or forgetting. In today’s world of rising great
powers, BRICS, resurgent China and Russia, the extra-legal political legitimacy
that once made this argument plausible as an alternative to a formal legal one is
not really evident. Should the United States or its allies act alone, they cannot
depend on the same general sense of political legitimacy that NATO could in
Kosovo as late as 1999.
Id.
153. For prominent defenses of this approach, see generally MICHAEL J. GLENNON,
THE FOG OF LAW: PRAGMATISM, SECURITY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010); Jutta Brunnée
& Stephen J. Toope, The Use of Force: International Law After Iraq, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.
785, 800 (2004) (“[H]umanitarian intervention may be maturing into an accepted legal
justification for the use of force.”); Michael C. Wood, Towards New Circumstances in Which
the Use of Force May Be Authorized? The Cases of Humanitarian Intervention, Counter-Terrorism,
and Weapons of Mass Destruction, in THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE USE OF FORCE: THEORY
AND REALITY—A NEED FOR CHANGE? 75, 82 (Niels Blokker & Nico Schrijver eds., 2005)
(“There are some who advocate a right of ‘humanitarian intervention’, others [including
the United Kingdom] who refer rather to an exceptional right to use force to avert an
‘overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe,’ and yet others who deny any such right.”).
154. It is important not to draw this distinction too sharply. Both camps would likely
regard authorization by the Security Council as both the most desirable resolution and as
dispositive of the question of legitimacy. See Matthew C. Waxman, Regulating Resort to Force:
Form and Substance of the UN Charter Regime, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 151 (2013). At least some
members of both camps would likely agree that the humanitarian intervention in some
situations would be desirable even absent Security Council Authorization. “One may like
or dislike this state of affairs, but so it is under lex lata.” Id. at 162 (quoting Antonio
Cassese, Ex Iniuria Ius Oritur: Are We Moving Towards International Legitimation of Forcible
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realpolitik are an integral part of the international “legal”
conversation and serve to keep international law relevant in light of
the changeable interests of powerful states.155
For instrumentalists, the moral considerations sketched in Part
II.A. amount to arguments of law in favor of intervention.
Instrumentalists view intervention in Syria as potentially justified
because the formal dictates of international law (those described in
the foregoing sections) fail to accommodate the strong moral and/or
policy imperatives of powerful international actors and of the
international system itself.156 Certainly the conflict in Syria is a
catastrophe. As discussed above, concerns about the protection of
individuals from war crimes, crimes against humanity, and massive
human rights violations at the hands of the very sovereigns charged
with their protection are, or have recently become, issues at the
center of international law.157 The vast majority of states, however,

Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 25 (1999)).
Where they would differ, crucially, is on the legal effect of their reasons for disliking the
prohibition of intervention.
155. See Anderson, supra note 152. Anderson notes:
This approach to international law differs from the “illegal but legitimate” way
of seeing international law, in that the pragmatic approach views these other
factors as part of international law itself, and indeed a vital way of ensuring that
international law remains relevant as law to the harsh realities of international
politics. It rejects formalism because it wraps these consequences-based, real
world concerns into the law itself—and hence offers a view of the law that is still
about law, but goes well beyond strict formalism.
Id.
156. Oxford University has prepared an excellent overview of academic writing on the
topic of Syria. Because of the fast pace of the debate, much of the conversation took place
on blogs or on the online publishing platforms of major journals. Debate Map: Use of Force
Against
Syria,
OXFORD
PUB.
INT’L
LAW,
http://opil.ouplaw.com/page/debate_map_syria/debate-map-use-of-force-against-syria
(last updated Apr. 29, 2014). Instrumentalist conceptions may be found in the arguments
of many contributors. Harold Koh offers one of the most powerful arguments in this
regard. See Koh, supra note 29, at 2 (“[Koh] agree[s] with former British Legal Advisor Sir
Daniel Bethlehem that ‘[i]n the case of the law on humanitarian intervention, an analysis
that simply relies on the prohibition of the threat or use of force in Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter, and its related principles of non-intervention and sovereignty, is . . . overly
simplistic.’” (quoting Daniel Bethlehem, Stepping Back a Moment—The Legal Basis in Favour
of a Principle of Humanitarian Intervention, BLOG OF THE EUR. J. INT’L L. (Sept. 12, 2013),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/stepping-back-a-moment-the-legal-basis-in-favour-of-a-principle-ofhumanitarian-intervention/)).
157. See Koh, supra note 29, at 3 (“A ‘per se illegal’ rule would overlook many other
pressing facts of great concern to international law that distinguish Syria from past cases:
including the catastrophic humanitarian situation, the likelihood of future atrocities, the
grievous nature of already-committed atrocities that amount to crimes against humanity
and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, the documented deliberate and
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would strongly disagree that the ascendance of concern for the
individual has displaced concern for the sovereign.158
One way in which such theories operate is to conflate moral or
policy considerations with the law and to resolve any apparent conflict
in favor of those considerations even when such a resolution requires
unsupportable readings of the law.159 Such theories do not help to
resolve the tension between the competing moral imperatives of
intervening to stop atrocities and upholding the rule of law because
they hold that the rule of law conforms itself to the moral and policy
imperatives of states—or at least certain states. This Article is not the
place to hash out, once again, the ongoing debate between
competing conceptions of international law. It should suffice to note
that the debate exists, and to describe the assumptions underlying the
positions taken herein.
F. Conclusion
All of the arguments outlined above attempt to reconcile a deep
dissonance. A fundamental norm of international law prohibits the
unauthorized use of force even when force would protect other
fundamental norms of international law and political morality.
Underlying the torturous readings, the pleas to changing custom, the
references to a hyper-flexible, quasi-legal conversation, is a sense that
international law is too fragile to survive that dissonance. Internal
contradictions must be explained away, no matter how convoluted the
explanations, because otherwise the strain would cause a
breakdown.160 But this insistence on fragility does a deeper disservice
indiscriminate use of chemical weapons against civilians in a way that threatens a centuryold ban, and the growing likelihood of regional insecurity.”).
158. The South Summit notes that:
We reaffirm that in our endeavors we are guided by all the principles and
purposes of the United Nations Charter and by full respect for the principles of
international law. To this end we uphold the principles of sovereignty and
sovereign equality of States, territorial integrity and non intervention in the
internal affairs of any State; . . . refrain in international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations . . . .
Group of 77 South Summit, supra note 119.
159. See generally Koh, supra note 29. Koh, for instance, sets up an opposition between
“per se illegality”—by which he means the clear, strong, and broad prohibition on the use
of force in the Charter and in customary international law—and the moral and policy
considerations favoring intervention. He reconciles the two by the simple expedient of
asserting that the latter trumps the former. Id.
160. To continue with the psychological metaphor, that insistence could also be seen as
a form of “gaslighting,” where someone is told over and over that they do not see what
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to international law by depriving it of the opportunity to confront,
and possibly transcend, its contradictions. “Protecting” international
law from its perceived weakness keeps it weak, ambiguous, malleable
and therefore vulnerable to power.
III. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
This Part offers a theory that characterizes an internationally
wrongful act as an act of international civil disobedience, or
something similar to it, provided that it is public, in the sense of
transparent (non-secret) and also in the sense of being an act of
public reason; conscientious; nonviolent to the maximum extent
possible; and, loyal to the law in the sense that the disobedient state
accepts the legal consequences of its actions.
This sets an
appropriately high bar, one that benefits states that choose to meet it
but that remain concerned about establishing a permissive
precedent.161
Awful choices abound under the analysis in Part II, above. To
intervene in Syria, the United States would have to advance a faulty
reading of the Charter and/or subsequent custom that purports to
find formal justification for some forms of intervention, endorse an
instrumentalist conception that subordinates international law to the
non-legal judgments of states, ignore the Charter and resurrect the
long-dead doctrine of reprisals, or attack without any pretense of
justification (“illegal but legitimate”).
Each of those choices
undermines the prohibition on the use of force and de-legitimizes
international law by showing it to be at best unable to constrain the
behavior of its subjects or at worst a mask for power. But to refrain
from intervening also risks de-legitimizing international law by
showing it to be unable to implement the fundamental moral
commitments of its constituents in the international community.
There is, however, a way not only to avoid the dilemma, but also to
ultimately strengthen international law.
The solution is to offer a theory based on civil disobedience and
use it to design a blueprint for a civilly disobedient and military
intervention. Theories of civil disobedience distinguish it from other
forms of illegal behavior, such as ordinary offenses (shoplifting, for
they do, in fact, see until they doubt their own perceptions. Into the space created by that
doubt steps the “gaslighter,” who by that exercise of power gets to substitute his own
vision. Powerful states have much to gain by insisting on the ambiguity and elasticity of
international law.
161. Recall that this was explicitly the concern of the United States in Kosovo.
Matheson, supra note 126.
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instance) or rebellion, because it is deeply loyal to the law. That
loyalty manifests itself in different ways according to different
theorists. For the most part this Article will rely on a Rawlsian theory
of civil disobedience. This is in part because his is one of the most
widely cited theories,162 but also because his emphasis on the nature
of civil disobedience as an act of public reason offers significant
assistance to the attempt to develop a theory that understands the
unauthorized use of force by one or more states against another as
supporting the rule of international law.
Adapting theories of civil disobedience to the international
system presents a number of serious problems. Perhaps the most
significant is that civil disobedience has generally been understood to
be the province of the oppressed, a way for the powerless to affect the
powerful. Ascribing the ability to engage in civil disobedience to the
world’s only superpower, or to other powerful states, clearly cuts
against the intuition that it is a tool of the downtrodden. Further
complicating the matter, the theory advanced in this Article purports
to encompass large-scale violence. Yet civil disobedience is widely
thought to require nonviolence.163 Although the requirement is not
absolute for some, it nonetheless remains a strong preference.164
Highlighting the relative power differential between protesters and
the strong states likely to engage in unauthorized intervention, the
latter may well escape legal sanctions for their actions while the
former may not. Many of these potential objections stem from the
nature of states, as opposed to individuals, as the relevant actors.
That states are the actors in the theory outlined herein gives rise to
another problem. Civil disobedience so far has been understood as a
phenomenon restricted to constitutional democracies where the
moral and political consensus underlying the state is sufficiently
robust to make moral claims on citizens that compete with the moral
162. See, e.g., Civil Disobedience, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/civil-disobedience (last updated Dec. 20, 2013) (“On
the most widely accepted account of civil disobedience, famously defended by John Rawls
(1971), civil disobedience is a public, non-violent and conscientious breach of law
undertaken with the aim of bringing about a change in laws or government policies.”).
Even after fifty years, scholars with differing views are careful to distinguish themselves
from Rawls. See A. John Simmons, Disobedience and Its Objects, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1805, 1809
(2010).
163. See John Rawls, Definition and Justification of Civil Disobedience, in CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE IN FOCUS 106 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1991); see also John Morreall, The
Justifibility of Violent Civil Disobedience, in CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN FOCUS, supra, at 130, 130;
Letter from Birmingham Jail, supra note 1.
164. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 226–43 (1979); John Morreall, supra note
163.
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imperative to obey the law. This leaves open the question of whether
the international system can be understood to support the practice.
In setting out the theory, the following sections attempt to
answer these objections. To the extent that those attempts are
unsuccessful, however, the argument also stands as an analogy that
draws on some elements of civil disobedience to describe a way in
which states may disregard international law in a principled way—
even if that principled disregard falls short of the “gold standard” of
civil disobedience.
Although the term “international civil
disobedience” is used frequently on its own, it should be understood
in each instance to encompass the “lesser included” standard of
principled disregard.
A. Is Civil Disobedience Restricted to Constitutional Democracies?
Civil disobedience is a way to resolve the conflict of duties where,
on the one hand, one may have a duty to obey the laws—say, in a
constitutional democracy or some other political order with a
measure of legitimacy—but where, on the other hand, one may have
a competing duty to “defend one’s liberties and . . . oppose
injustice.”165 This is a remarkably similar tension to the one that arises
when considering unauthorized intervention in cases of massive
human rights abuses. Caution is in order, however. It is always
tempting for anyone writing about international law to simply import
ideas developed to describe domestic systems into the international
sphere. Readers should always view that enterprise with skepticism.
International law is different in kind than the national law of states.
John Austin famously expressed doubt about the conceptual
possibility of international law, since it lacked the character of
enforceable commands issued by a sovereign.166 Other scholars
disagree, of course, and Tom Franck argued that international law—
then in the early days of its post-Cold War renaissance—had “entered
its post-ontological era.”167
The fundamental difference of
international law from other, more recognizable, systems of law is
precisely what has given rise to the competing conceptions described
above as formalism and instrumentalism. Certainly civil disobedience
would be nonsensical under an instrumentalist conception of
international law, where there is at best a weak duty to comply with

165. Rawls, supra note 163, at 103.
166. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 171 (Wilfrid E.
Rumble ed., 1995).
167. FRANCK, supra note 150, at 6; see also JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999).
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the law. Under that conception there would be no need for an
elaborate theory of civil disobedience, or for adherence to the
requirements of that theory for the sake of validating the dissenting
act.
Whether disobedience can even make any sense in the context of
the non-democratic international system must be answered before
moving on. Most theorists discuss civil disobedience as something
that occurs in a constitutional democracy, and thereby distinguish it
from resistance to anti-liberal, oppressive rule.168 To discern whether
international law might nonetheless “qualify” despite its dissimilarities
it is worth taking a closer look at why constitutional democracies
support the practice of civil disobedience. Rawls, for instance,
suggests that civil disobedience stems from perceived transgressions
of shared fundamental principles of justice:
[T]his theory is designed only for the special case of a nearly
just society, one that is well-ordered for the most part but in
which some serious violations of justice nevertheless do
occur. Since I assume that a state of near justice requires a
democratic regime, the theory concerns the role and the
appropriateness of civil disobedience to legitimately
established democratic authority.169
But notice the direction of Rawls’s reasoning here. It does not
seem to be constitutional democracy qua constitutional democracy
that gives rise to the possibility of civil disobedience. Rather it seems
that a nearly just society imperfectly organized according to some
basic principles of justice that can be appealed to when that
imperfection manifests itself:
[O]ne invokes the commonly shared conception of justice
that underlies the political order. It is assumed that in a
reasonably just democratic regime there is a public
conception of justice by reference to which citizens regulate
their political affairs and interpret the constitution. The

168. In cases of oppressive societies, basic freedoms are not respected and equality is
not guaranteed. One is free to rebel against such oppression. As Rawls succinctly puts it,
“[t]here is no difficulty about such action in this case.” Rawls, supra note 163, at 103; see
also Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, in CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN FOCUS, supra note
163, at 28, 28; Jürgen Habermas, Civil Disobedience: Litmus Test for the Democratic
Constitutional State, 30 BERKELEY J. SOC. 95 (1985); see generally CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN
FOCUS supra note 163.
169. Rawls, supra note 163, at 103.

2015]

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

359

persistent and deliberate violation of the basic
principles . . . invites either submission or resistance.170
Constitutional democracy just happened to be the only type of
social organization Rawls considered, at the time, to have those
features. The question then becomes whether the international
system is based on sufficiently shared principles of justice such that
when the institutions created to implement them fall short
international civil disobedience becomes possible.
Answering that question requires either choosing an existing
theory of international law or advancing a new one. The latter is far
beyond the scope of this Article. Since his is the most influential
account of civil disobedience, it is worth examining whether on
Rawls’s own account international law would be sufficiently robust to
support civil disobedience. However, accepting the possibility of
international civil disobedience does not require accepting Rawls’s
particular theory. Since the possibility of civil disobedience rests on
the existence of sufficiently strong and sufficiently shared normative
commitments, any theory that would either find those in the abstract
(liberal cosmopolitanism) or derive them from social facts
(positivism) would suffice.
The question of whether such
commitments would include military intervention to stop atrocities is,
of course, a separate question.171
In The Law of Peoples, Rawls takes the position that the
international system rests on shared basic principles of justice, from
which position it follows that the system is “just enough” to support
international civil disobedience.
Rawls posits an international
original position from which basic principles of justice would emerge
that would regulate interactions among peoples.172 He is quite

170. Id. at 106.
171. See infra Part IV.
172. For reasons that are not relevant in the present context, Rawls chooses the term
“peoples” as opposed to the term “nations.” RAWLS, supra note 167. For the sake of
fidelity Rawls’s terminology will be followed here. For a more thorough discussion of the
distinction see id. The Law of Peoples received much criticism. While many are from
commentators who doubt the validity of the liberal internationalist enterprise, many are
from “internal” critics who justifiably take issue with Rawls’s narrow and restrictive list of
basic principles and his cursory treatment of the limited set of human rights he
recognizes. The intent here is not to endorse Rawls’s limited and unnecessarily
paternalistic cosmopolitanism but rather to show that the international system as he
conceives it supports the practice of civil disobedience as he conceives it—both in the
general sense and in the specific case of an otherwise conscientious U.S. military
intervention in Syria. See William Magnuson, The Responsibility to Protect and the Decline of
Sovereignty: Free Speech Protection Under International Law, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 255,
294–95 (2010).
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cautious about the nature of such principles, and of the type of
cooperation they would engender. Specifically he follows Kant, and
many others, in believing a world state to be undesirable in theory
and impossible in practice. He withholds judgment about what types
of institutions a well-organized society of peoples might create, but
does note that “there will be many different kinds of organizations
subject to the judgment of the Law of Peoples and charged with
regulating cooperation among them and meeting certain recognized
duties.”173 In short, Rawls does not understand the law of peoples as
being restricted to a small set of normative commitments (the basic
principles of justice) but rather believes that those normative
commitments will be implemented through a set of cooperative
institutional arrangements. Since it is precisely in the gap between
fundamental normative commitments and their implementing
institutional arrangements (laws, regulations, and policies) that one
finds the justification for civil disobedience, it seems that Rawls might
acknowledge the possibility that a specific institutional
arrangement—such as, for instance, the voting structure of the
Security Council that might frustrate the achievement of one of the
basic principles.
Rawls puts forward eight principles for ordering the
international basic structure, of which the fourth is particularly
important in the present context: “Peoples are to observe the duty of
nonintervention (except to address grave violations of human
rights).”174
B. Political and Public
The international system in general supports the practice of
international civil disobedience, and R2P in particular describes a
moral commitment which, if not implemented, would justify specific
acts of disobedience. Importantly, looking at international practice
through the lens of civil disobedience allows a shift away from
attempts to glean a legal justification from the documentary and
diplomatic history of R2P and toward a re-reading of that history as
evidence of a common political commitment. A purely legal analysis
restricts one’s attention to the legal texts and to the force of those
texts. The nature of customary international law certainly widens the
scope beyond written texts by requiring consideration of both the
behavior and attitudes of states. But this includes only a very small set
173. RAWLS, supra note 167, at 36.
174. Id. at 37.
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of attitudes, ones that express opinio juris. As shown above, there is
little to find in that regard, and attempts to read more strongly
expressed moral and policy considerations into the law fail insofar as
they slide into instrumentalism, subordinate international law to the
non-legal judgments of states, and leave interveners open to charges
of being more concerned with power than with law. Attempting to
understand whether unauthorized military intervention can qualify as
international civil disobedience, however, directs attention precisely
to the existence and nature of bedrock principles and the extent to
which laws and policies reflect them.
The essence of civil disobedience and what distinguishes it from
other forms of unlawful activity is that it is, fundamentally, an act of
public reason. It is a plea to the majority to reconcile a law,
regulation, or policy that is, in the protester’s view, contrary to the
basic principles of justice to which both the protester and her
audience adhere. In the present context that law would be the
Charter system’s restriction of the use of force to self-defense or
intervention authorized by the Security Council, which by its
unreasonable restriction of legal discourse to bygone binaries
prevents the international community from acting on its deeper
commitment to protecting human rights. Civil disobedience is
therefore political in the sense that it appeals to common political
commitments and not to particular conceptions of the good.175
Individual religious beliefs, policy preferences, or personal moral
preferences would not be sufficient to qualify an unlawful act as civil
disobedience.176 That is because the liberal society of states admits of
multiple reasonable conceptions of the good, including several
competing religious doctrines, and does not favor one over the other.
Civil disobedience on this view is a liberal rather than a radical
act. It seeks to engage with, to reform, but ultimately to uphold the
existing order. In contrast, radical action would seek to disrupt,
dismantle, and replace the existing order with something else. The
disobedient and her audience share similar normative commitments
although they may disagree on the appropriate way to implement
those commitments. This shared commitment to common norms is
an important component of the argument that civil disobedience
serves to strengthen and stabilize, rather than harm, the system in
which it is deployed.

175. Rawls, supra note 163, at 105–06.
176. Id. For Martin Luther King, Jr., on the other hand, religious belief certainly
justified civil disobedience. Letter from Birmingham Jail, supra note 1.
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What if any common principles of (international) political
morality could be the subject of appeal in an instance of civilly
disobedient military intervention?177 R2P is just such a principle. As
shown in Part I.A., above, over the course of two decades nearly every
member state of the United Nations has signed on to a series of
declarations and resolutions affirming their common commitment to
recognizing that every member of the international community has an
obligation to protect civilians from mass atrocities.
There are also reasons in theory to believe that any “just enough”
international system would include some version of R2P. Returning
to The Law of Peoples, Rawls examines the international basic structure,
the set of institutions that together comprise the international
system.178 He contends that, just as with any domestic system, the
international basic structure must be justified with respect to certain
underlying principles. Those principles include the following:
1. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention.
2. Peoples have a right to self-defense but no right to instigate
war for reasons other than self-defense.
3. Peoples are to honor human rights.179
At first glance the principles of non-intervention and self-defense
would seem to preclude using military force to remedy gross human
rights violations. However, Rawls acknowledges that the list is
incomplete. He specifically mentions that “[a] principle such as the
fourth—that of non-intervention—will obviously have to be qualified
in the general case of outlaw states and grave violation of human
rights.”180 Rawls does not elaborate much on the justifications for
humanitarian intervention, but does offer some hints that are
particularly relevant in the present context:
Human rights are a class of rights that play a special role in
the Law of Peoples: they restrict the justifying reasons for
war and its conduct, and they specify limits to the regime’s
internal autonomy. In this way they reflect the two basic and
historically profound changes in how the powers of
sovereignty have been conceived since World War II. First,
war is no longer an admissible means of government policy
177. In the domestic case, Rawls limits the principles that might give rise to justifiable
civil disobedience to violations of equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity, but
excludes violations of the difference principle on the basis that violations of the latter are
much more difficult to discern. Rawls, supra note 163, at 108–09.
178. RAWLS, supra note 167.
179. Id. at 37.
180. Id.
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and is justified only in self-defense or, in grave cases of
intervention to protect human rights.181
Later he explicitly considers the question of “whether it is ever
legitimate to interfere with outlaw states simply because they violate
human rights, even though they are not dangerous and aggressive
towards other states, and indeed may be quite weak.”182 He answers in
the affirmative: “Is there ever a time when forceful intervention might
be called for? If offense’s against human rights are egregious and the
society does not respond to the imposition of sanctions, such
intervention in the defense of human rights would be acceptable and
would be called for.”183
But civil disobedience is not only concerned with the features of
the social system in which it takes place. Equally important is the
extent to which the disobedient is acting in good faith.
C. Conscientiousness
Good faith, although it stems from the internal state of mind of
the actor purporting to be engaged in civil disobedience, must be
demonstrated by objective acts indicating conscientiousness. Those
include exhausting non-disobedient avenues184 and being willing to
accept the legal consequences of the disobedient act.185 The
conscientiousness requirement in general stems from the nature of
civil disobedience as an act of public reason, one that ultimately seeks
to support and affirm the system it aims at—unlike radical action or
rebellion seeking to dismantle the existing order. That is, as an act of
public reason, civil disobedience must be public (non-secret), have a
publicly announced justification, and be in furtherance of public
principles of justice as opposed to individual moral beliefs or naked
self-interest. Since the basic principles of justice are, presumably,
openly available, one might assess the conscientiousness of a potential
disobedient (in part at least) by the extent to which her announced
justification actually conforms to existing principles of justice. But is
that enough? What if she is lying?

181. Id. at 79.
182. Id. at 92.
183. Id. at 93 (emphasis added).
184. See, e.g., Rawls, supra note 163, at 109–10 (“[T]he normal appeals to the political
majority have already been made in good faith and that they have failed.”).
185. Id. at 106–07 (“[Civil disobedience] expresses disobedience to law within the
limits of fidelity to law, although it is at the outer edge thereof. The law is broken, but
fidelity to law is expressed by the public and nonviolent nature of the act, by the willingness
to accept the legal consequences of one’s conduct.” (emphasis added)).
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The objective requirements of conscientiousness help the
disobedient actor’s audience evaluate her sincerity, since no one can
know her subjective intent.186 In the case of international civil
disobedience the audience would be the organs of the international
system, such as the United Nations, and other states. In front of such
an audience, objectively defined criteria of good faith become even
more important than in the case of individuals—particularly where
the actor claiming conscientiousness is one of the powerful states that
tend to engage in unauthorized military intervention. In the case of
Syria, for instance, many states have already questioned the good faith
of the United States.187 This is true both in light of its past breaches
of the prohibition on the use of force and in light of its persistent
refusal to offer a detailed justification of its potential intervention in
Syria. Russia and China, for instance, take issue with the extent of
military operations in Libya, which in their view, significantly
overreached the modest confines of action authorized—with their
acquiescence—by the Security Council.188 They have made it clear
that in their view such overreaching constituted bad faith and that the
U.S. position on Syria in the Security Council is similarly in bad
faith—specifically, that the United States is seeking apparently modest
resolutions that it intends to use as the basis, however farfetched, for
military intervention.189 If the United States were to announce its
understanding that unauthorized military intervention in Syria is
illegal under international law but required by the common moral
commitments of the international community, it would sap much of
186. Id. at 107 (“No doubt it is possible to imagine a legal system in which
conscientious belief that the law is unjust is accepted as a defense for noncompliance.
Men of great honesty with full confidence in one another might make such a system work.
But as things are, such a scheme would presumably be unstable even in a state of near
justice. We must pay a certain price to convince others that our actions have, in our
carefully considered view, a sufficient moral basis in the political convictions of the
community.”).
187. Elizabeth Djinis, Protestors Argue Against U.S. Intervention in Syria, DUKE CHRONICLE
(Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.dukechronicle.com/articles/2013/09/10/protesters-argueagainst-us-intervention-syria; Wadah Khanfar, Syrians Want Rid of President Assad, but Without
U.S.
Bombs,
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
2,
2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/02/syrians-rid-assad-without-usbombs; Michael T. Klare, Why the Push for Syrian Intervention Is About More Than Just Assad,
THE NATION (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/176100/why-pushsyrian-intervention-about-more-just-assad#.
188. Micah Zenko, By Overreaching in Libya, NATO Has Left Syria to Fend Alone, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN REL. (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/nato/overreaching-libya-nato-hasleft-syria-fend-alone/p26153.
189. China, Russia Snub UN Security Council Talks on Syrian Aid, SOUTH CHINA MORNING
POST (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1425867/china-russiasnub-un-security-council-talks-syrian-aid.
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the strength from such accusations.
But even with such an
announcement, if the United States were to violate international law
with impunity it would be extremely difficult to avoid the perception
that the military intervention—no matter how well justified as a
matter of political morality—was an exercise of unaccountable power.
It is therefore critically important that states purporting to
engage in international civil disobedience accept the legal
consequences of their disobedient acts. Recall that the theory of
international civil disobedience is aimed at states that wish to uphold
international law even while responding to moral imperatives that
international law inadequately implements. Violating the law with
impunity has the opposite effect; instead of demonstrating the
disobedient state’s fealty to international law, it reinforces widely held
perceptions that international law is a weak constraint ultimately
subordinate to the preferences of states190 or simply a disingenuous
mask for power.191 The antidote to those critiques, and a necessary—
though not sufficient—characteristic of international civil
disobedience is therefore that the disobedient state submit voluntarily
to international adjudication.
Institutively it may not seem to be enough merely to submit to a
legal process that may or may not result in sanctions. Certainly
Dr. King, as reflected in the opening quotation of this Article,
believed that jail time serves the important purpose of highlighting
the injustice that was the subject of the protest. But it is not clear that
actual sanctions—as opposed to a demonstrated willingness to risk
such sanctions—are required for an act to be considered civil
disobedience. Conceptually, to the extent that the acceptance of
legal consequences is intended to demonstrate fealty to the system
then putting oneself at the mercy of that system—whatever the
outcome—would certainly demonstrate that fealty. Analogically, it
seems unlikely that we would take away from protesters who take to
the streets the mantle of civil disobedient simply because the city
where they were protesting chose to “catch and release” rather than
press charges. The United States might therefore be understood to
satisfy this criterion by submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the ICJ,

190. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER
AND PEACE (2d ed. 1954); GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, THE FRONTIERS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1962); Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34 AM. J.
INT’L L. 260 (1940).
191. CARL SCHMITT, THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE JUS
PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM (2003).
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even if the ICJ ultimately imposes no sanction. As discussed in more
detail below, this can be accomplished by accepting the jurisdiction of
the ICJ for disputes arising from the unauthorized military
intervention.
None of the foregoing guarantees that all acts of international
civil disobedience will be undertaken in good faith. Neither this
suggestion nor civil disobedience theories more generally can fully
account for instances where someone is lying about the justification
for their actions or has ulterior motives for undertaking the conduct
in question. But the requirements of civil disobedience, taken as a
whole, set an extremely high bar for the conduct of either persons or
states. Someone (or some state) acting in bad faith would, one
imagines, find it difficult to declare their justification—publicly
broadcasting a lie far and wide—and to submit, again publicly, to
adjudication of those acts. Furthermore, in the case of international
law, a state that lies about the justification for its actions risks
contributing to the creation of new customary international law based
on its untruthful opinio juris—an outcome it would likely wish to
avoid. But even if a state believes in good faith that unauthorized
military intervention is necessary to vindicate important shared
principles of international justice, can violent civil disobedience ever
be justified?
D. (Non) Violent?
If R2P qualifies as a basic principle of justice, and the principle
itself contemplates violence under some circumstances, then violent
international civil disobedience in support of that principle must, at
least under some circumstances, be justified. That position runs
contrary to much of the thinking on civil disobedience,192 although a
minority view holds violence to be at least sometimes justified.193 The
hesitation of theorists opposed to violence, however, seems to be
more a strong presumption than an a priori position that it is
categorically prohibited.194 The question then becomes whether that
presumption can be overcome.

192. See, e.g., MAHATMA GANDHI, ALL MEN ARE BROTHERS 85–107 (Krishna Kripalani
ed., 2d ed. 1969); Rawls, supra note 163; see generally Letter from Birmingham Jail, supra
note 1; CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN FOCUS, supra note 163.
193. Joseph Raz, for instance, raised the question of why, if an act of civil disobedience
were to be justified at all—a very high bar, considering the inherent illegality of the act—
violence would automatically be unjustified. Joseph Raz, Civil Disobedience, in CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE IN FOCUS, supra note 163, at 159.
194. Rawls, for instance, takes violence to obscure the communicative nature of the act:
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A novel question for civil disobedience theory, which arises from
the case of the United States and Syria, suggests how the presumption
against violence might be overcome: What if basic principles of justice
required violence, and the law prohibited that required violence?195
Suppose, for instance, that in the Jim Crow South a county or
municipality passed a law prohibiting third parties from interfering
with a lynching. Suppose further that outraged locals formed an antilynch mob with the publicly expressed intention to forcibly prevent
any further lynching in that town. If the anti-lynch mob violently
clashed with a lynch mob, succeeding in rescuing the potential victim,
would that violence obscure the communicative nature of the rescue?
Suppose the lynch mob was ready for its opponents, who were
arrested after a scuffle, and that the murder then proceeded as
planned. It seems counterintuitive to assert that being arrested in the
course of trying to prevent a cold-blooded murder would not be at
least as communicative of the absurdity of the law as would an
unsanctioned protest on the steps of City Hall. If the members of the
anti-lynch mob then stood trial and accepted the legal consequences
of their actions, would the fact of their violence undermine their
claim to fealty to the law?
On this view the Assad regime’s murder of tens of thousands of
civilians and its displacement of millions more create a moral
obligation, stemming from fundamental principles of justice, to use
violence. The implementation of that obligation is frustrated by the
operation of law. Surely in such a situation accomplishing the
violence required by principle but prevented by law would demonstrate,
rather than detract from, fidelity to the rule of law?
[Civil disobedience] tries to avoid the use of violence, especially against persons,
not from the abhorrence of the use of force in principle, but because it is a final
expression of one’s case. To engage in violent acts likely to injure and to hurt is
incompatible with civil disobedience as a mode of address.
Rawls, supra note 163, at 106. Habermas is also concerned with the communicative nature
of civil disobedience (which he terms “symbolic”) and similarly eschews violence.
Habermas, supra note 168.
195. Although early Rawls opposed violent civil disobedience, later Rawls argued that
some basic principles of justice require it. See Rawls, supra note 163, at 106 (“To engage in
violent acts likely to injure and to hurt is incompatible with civil disobedience as a mode of
address.”). The Law of Peoples explicitly lists violence against illiberal regimes committing
massive human rights violations as a basic principle of international justice. RAWLS, supra
note 167, at 93–94 n.6 (“Is there ever a time when more forceful intervention might be
called for? If the offenses against human rights are egregious and the society does not
respond the imposition of sanctions, such intervention in defense of human rights would
be acceptable and would be called for.”). Rawls’s own position in The Law of Peoples
therefore casts doubt on the applicability of his objection, on the grounds of fidelity, to
violent civil disobedience.
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E. Conclusion
Civil disobedience stabilizes and strengthens the system of which
it is a part. “Indeed, civil disobedience . . . is one of the stabilizing
devices of a constitutional system, although by definition an illegal
one.”196 In that sense international civil disobedience is the opposite
of the move to define away problematic applications of international
law; to argue for the possibility of international civil disobedience is to
argue that international law is robust enough to confront its
contradictions head on. The stabilizing effect stems from the
distinguishing feature of an almost just society, as opposed to, for
instance, a monarchy based on divine right or an illiberal society
based on autocratic rule: the free and freely chosen cooperation
among individuals garnered by the attractiveness of shared basic
principles of justice.197 A consequence of basing a society on such
freely chosen cooperation is the freedom of individual members of
that society to express their discontent with the current form of that
cooperation. But that is not to say that members of constitutional
democracies, or states in the international system, are free to disobey
the law at any time or for any reason. That would negate the concept
of law and undermine fidelity to the rule of law. Rather, it is to say
that when specific institutional expressions of that core agreement
divert from its content, then actors should be free to disagree. The
following Part will outline just what such a disagreement would look
like under the theory of international civil disobedience.
IV. BLUEPRINT FOR CIVILLY DISOBEDIENT MILITARY INTERVENTION
Had the United States done nothing differently than it did,
except followed through with its intention of using force against Syria,
that act would already have shared many of the above-described
characteristics of civil disobedience. It would have been transparent,
at least arguably within the boundaries of qualifying violence,
conscientious, and public in the sense of transparency. But it would
not, without more, have been public in the sense of a communicative
act designed to perfect a mostly just system, nor would it have served
to strengthen the rule of law. This Part will sketch some ideas about
what more the United States, or any potential future belligerent,
could do to make sure its acts are understood to be international civil
disobedience and thereby preserve the rule of international law in the
face of extra-Charter violence.
196. Rawls, supra note 163, at 114; see also Habermas, supra note 168, at 95–116.
197. Rawls, supra note 163, at 114.
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A. Going Public
To qualify unauthorized military intervention in Syria as civil
disobedience, the United States would need to make it clear to the
world that its actions were motivated by public principles of justice as
opposed to private morality, policy, or naked self-interest. As a
preliminary matter, that would require the Obama administration to
release a detailed justification for military intervention, something
that at the time of this writing it has not done.198 The world has
therefore been left to puzzle out possible justifications based on hints
dropped by a number of officials in speeches and interviews.
The next question would then be whether the United States
would be “invok[ing] the commonly shared conception of justice that
underlies the political order.”199 This narrows the options for the
United States. President Obama’s contention, for instance, that the
Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons would justify the use of force
to degrade its ability to do so and to deter future use would not likely
pass muster unless an argument could be constructed that the
international community has come together to reintroduce the
principle of armed reprisals. This is where reframing the history of
humanitarian intervention and R2P as the emergence of a moral
principle rather than a legal one pays off.200 R2P can be understood as
the articulation by the international community of one of its core
principles. Certainly, proponents of the doctrine see it that way.
B. Accepting the Consequences
To demonstrate its fidelity to the law, the United States would
need to accept the legal consequences of conducting unauthorized
military interventions against Syria. The most straightforward way for
it to do that would be to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ for
contentious cases arising from its intervention, but the ICJ is far from
the only possible forum. A brief review of practice in the twentieth
century reveals several creative approaches to interstate dispute

198. Koh, supra note 29 (“Given the importance of the issue, it is critically important
that the Obama Administration soon issue its detailed legal opinion elaborating her view.
Why not explain—not just in lay terms as President Obama recently did, but in legal
language that international lawyers can debate (as the U.K.’s Attorney General did in Syria
and in Kosovo)—why a limited use of force in extraordinary circumstances can fit within a
legitimate process of reconstructing international law?”).
199. Rawls, supra note 163, at 106. Recall that for Rawls this is a very high standard—he
even excluded his own difference principle from consideration as a motivation for
justified civil disobedience. Id.
200. See supra Part II.A.
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resolution. Since the theory of civil disobedience calls for fidelity to
the law, and not necessarily to any particular legal institution, the
United States would seem to be free to choose the forum.201 The ICJ
is, however, the “principal judicial organ of the United Nations”202
and it provides an authoritative and ready-made forum. Acceptance
of the jurisdiction of the ICJ is voluntary,203 and neither the United
States nor Syria has agreed to compulsory jurisdiction.204
Submission of a dispute to the ICJ would therefore require an
affirmative act on the part of the United States (and also on the part
of Syria, but we are here concerned only with understanding how the
United States might engage in international civil disobedience).
Such an affirmative act would significantly strengthen the claim of the
United States to fealty to the law. One way for the case to come to the
ICJ would be through a special agreement where the parties (the
United States and Syria) jointly refer the case to the Court as
contemplated under Article 36(1) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice (“the Statute”).205 But that option has the drawback
of requiring the United States to negotiate with Syria, which might be
difficult in the aftermath of an attack. In the alternative, the United
States could make a declaration under the Optional Clause of the
Statute (Art. 36 paragraph 2),206 which would allow it to tailor its
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court to cover only the
timeframe of its unauthorized intervention, only disputes arising from
201. Some choices, such as international arbitration, would also give the parties control
over the applicable law. It is an interesting question, albeit one beyond the scope of this
Article, the extent to which the United States could modify the applicable law and still be
said to be expressing fealty to it. And what role would Syria’s hypothetical consensus have
on that question?
202. ICJ Statute, supra note 101, 59 Stat. at 1055.
203. Article 36 of the ICJ’s Statute provides, in pertinent part, that:
1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it
and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in
treaties and conventions in force.
2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they
recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to
any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all
legal disputes . . . .
3. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on
condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or for a certain
time.
Id. at 1060.
204. Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3 (last visited
Oct. 12, 2014).
205. ICJ Statute, supra note 101, 59 Stat. at 1060.
206. Id.
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that intervention, only disputes initiated by Syria, or any combination
of those or other conditions.207 Even if Syria never initiated
proceedings, the United States would satisfy the criterion of accepting
the legal consequences of its acts by opening itself up to the
jurisdiction of the Court, since if Syria did bring a case, the United
States would be compelled to participate.
In any case before the ICJ, the United States would have to
concede the unlawfulness of its actions but could at the same time
argue that it should not have to pay damages to Syria because the
latter would lack standing based on the doctrine of unclean hands.
The concept of civil disobedience requires the disobedient actor to
believe that her action is, in fact, illegal,208 and the analysis provided
above in Part II shows that to be the case. Furthermore, the very
nature of customary international law requires a state concerned to
maintain the cohesion of the prohibition on the use of force to avoid
appearing to endorse its customary modification. That is because
customary international law changes only over time and only once a
general practice and accompanying opinio juris have crystallized,
which necessarily implies a period of experimentation during which
states would use force illegally.209 To change customary international
law you have to break existing international law.210 Weakening the
207. The plain text of Articles 36(2) and 36(3) might give the impression that a state
can only impose certain narrow restrictions on its acceptance. However,
[t]he two World Courts have never taken such a restrictive view. From the early
days of the PCIJ, States engaged in a practice of carefully defined reservations
suiting their individual needs, as perceived by them. . . . In sum, the freedom of
States to confine the scope of their declarations . . . may perhaps have certain
ultimate limitations, but such limitations are no more than a theoretical
construct, lacking any relevance in practice.
THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 683 (Andreas
Zimmermann et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012).
208. Rawls noted that “the civilly disobedient act is indeed thought to be contrary to
law, at least in the sense that those engaged in it are not simply presenting a test case for a
constitutional decision; they are prepared to oppose the statute even if it should be
upheld.” Rawls, supra note 163 at 105.
209. Koh, supra note 29 (“In the future, other less-humanitarian minded states can cite
Obama’s threat and put their own broad spin on the legal interpretation, to use the murky
concepts of humanitarian intervention and R2P for their own self-interested purposes.”).
Koh is here referring to the result of conducting unauthorized humanitarian intervention
without announcing any justification, but it would apply equally well to the likely extended
period of time where customary international law was in the process of evolving.
210. See Allen Buchanan, Reforming the International Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 136 (J.L.
Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003) (“[H]eavy reliance on customary law, absence
of a sovereign universal legislature, and the obvious limitations of the treaty process
together result in a system in which reform without illegality is more difficult than in
domestic systems.”).
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prohibition on the use of force in that way is precisely the result the
theory presented in this Article seeks to avoid. By acknowledging the
illegality of its actions under international law, and highlighting the
incompatibility of that illegality with the principle of R2P, the United
States would “arouse the conscience of the [international]
community over its injustice”211 and thereby hasten other avenues of
legal reform. But acknowledging responsibility does not necessarily
mean that the United States would have to pay damages to Syria.
The United States could argue that the doctrine of “clean hands”
bars Syria’s claims for damages even if the United States conceded
responsibility.212 Although the principle is not universally understood
to apply in international law, the Court has applied versions of it in
the past, and has never declared it inapplicable despite several
opportunities to do so. As Stephen Schwebel, himself a former judge
on the ICJ, nominated by the United States, noted:
The following conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing
cases in which an argument of clean hands has been
invoked: (a) a number of States have maintained the vitality
and applicability of the principle of clean hands in interState disputes; and (b) the ICJ has not rejected the principle
though it has generally failed to apply it. In the Meuse Water
case, the PCIJ embraced a related principle, and in the Case
concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project, the ICJ gave
expression to the principle ex injuria jus non oritur.213
Others are less cautious.214 Clearly Syria’s hands are “odiously
unclean.” The Assad regime has repeatedly violated international
211. Letter from Birmingham Jail, supra note 1.
212. See BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 156 (Stevens & Sons 1953)) (“A Party who asks for redress must
present himself with clean hands.”); Rahim Moloo, A Comment on the Clean Hands Doctrine
in International Law, 7 INTER ALIA 39, 39 (2010).
213. STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FURTHER SELECTED
WRITINGS 300–01 (2011); see also HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 420–21 (1947) (“The principle ex injuria jus non oritur is one of the fundamental
maxims of jurisprudence. An illegality cannot, as a rule, become a source of legal right to
the wrongdoer.”).
214. Schwebel himself endorsed the principle much more strongly in his dissenting
opinion in Nicaragua. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 268 (June 27) (Schwebel, J., dissenting) (“Nicaragua has not
come to Court with clean hands. On the contrary, as the aggressor, indirectly
responsible—but ultimately responsible—for large numbers of deaths and widespread
destruction . . . . Nicaragua’s hands are odiously unclean . . . . Thus . . . Nicaragua’s
claims against the United States should fail.”); see also Special Rapporteur on Diplomatic
Protection, Sixth Rep. on Diplomatic Protection, ¶ 6, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/546 (Aug. 11, 2004) (by John Dugard) (“The . . . cases make it difficult to sustain
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law, thereby creating the very situation that invited intervention
(according to a principle that Syria itself agreed to on more than one
occasion).215 The United States would therefore be in a position to
argue that Syria should not have the standing to claim damages for
acts occasioned by its own illegal conduct.216 If ever the Court were to
reject a state’s standing for unclean hands, the case of Syria or, by
implication, of future states subject to unauthorized military
intervention to stop mass atrocities, would be the opportune time to
do so.
C. But Is It Practicable?
Following the blueprint set forth above would offer several
practical benefits to the United States. Setting international civil
disobedience as the standard for justified unauthorized military
intervention would set a high bar for other states to follow and would
serve as a deterrent for states acting in bad faith. The Court’s
rejection of Syria’s standing for unclean hands would not only save
the United States from the paradoxical result of having to pay to
rebuild that which it had just destroyed, but it would also serve as a
moral vindication for the United States; a vindication in which one
could imagine other international bodies and members of the
international community joining.217 That victory would arouse the
conscience of the international community, would grant the United
States the moral high ground in future discussion about the use of
force, and would allow it to lead the way to a more just institutional
arrangement.
Furthermore, acknowledging the illegality of its unauthorized
military intervention would be the only way for the United States to
maintain the status quo while reform efforts are underway. The
hesitation of the United States to publicly announce a legal, as

the argument that the clean hands doctrine does not apply to disputes involving direct
inter-State relations.”).
215. Recall that the World Summit Outcome was a consensual resolution. See supra
Part II.A.
216. “Thus a State which is guilty of illegal conduct may be deprived of the necessary
locus standi in judicio for complaining of corresponding illegalities on the part of other
States, especially if these were consequential on or were embarked upon in order to counter its own
illegality—in short were provoked by it.” Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of
International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, in 92 RECUEIL DES COURS
1, 119 (1957) (emphasis added).
217. Tom Franck argued that the international community already exercises this
approval (or disapproval where warranted) of unauthorized interventions, and that in that
way it functions as something analogous to a jury. FRANCK, supra note 11.
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opposed to moral or policy justification for attacking either Kosovo or
Syria (saying that there is such a justification, but refusing to share it,
does not count) could be read as a desire to prevent other states from
using it as a basis to launch their own attacks. But as the continuing
debates generated by Kosovo have shown, intervening without
announcing a justification creates ambiguity. Intervening while
announcing a specious justification, on the other hand, would tarnish
the reputation of the United States as a law abiding member of the
international community, undermine the prohibition on the use of
force, and risk the specious justification acquiring the status of
customary international law.
Only acknowledging that the
intervention is illegal removes ambiguity while blocking the
emergence of new customary international law.
V. CONCLUSION
States do not have to choose between the apparently conflicting
moral imperatives to stop mass atrocities and to uphold the rule of
law. Rather, they can engage in international civil disobedience, or
the principled disregard of international law, and thereby “break[]”
international law while “expressing the highest respect for
[international] law.”218 This is not a permissive standard, however.
Engaging in international civil disobedience requires states to be
public and transparent about their motivations, to demonstrate good
faith by appealing only to basic shared principles of justice (and not
to self-interest), and to accept the legal consequences of their actions
by submitting to the jurisdiction of the ICJ (or another adjudicatory
body). The ICJ, for its part, would be called on to determine whether
the target state committed mass atrocities that precluded its recovery,
based on the principle of clean hands, despite the illegality of the
intervention.
The theory set forth in this Article, if put into practice by the
United States and other states that might be tempted to engage in
unauthorized military intervention, would have a profound effect on
the world order. The U.S. Department of State was divided on
intervention in Kosovo. The policy officials wanted it but the legal
officers refused to certify its legality.219 The result was also divided—
an intervention with a justification in policy but not in law. In turn,
that divided result gave rise to persistent ambiguity and confusion

218. Letter from Birmingham Jail, supra note 1.
219. David Kaye, who served at the time in the Office of the Legal Adviser (though not
on the Kosovo issue), has recently written about this. See Kaye, supra note 91.
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about a norm that should be sharp and clear: the prohibition on the
use of force. Removing that division and clarifying that ambiguity
might encourage more intervention by well-intentioned states while
setting the bar too high for ill-intentioned states to meet.
Undertaking unauthorized military intervention as international civil
disobedience will remove the whiff of illegitimacy that has always
accompanied the practice and strengthen the international
community’s ability to stop mass atrocities and end the conflicts that
give rise to them.
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